

# bulletin





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## Results of Meeting of NAC, Ottawa, September 15-20

### COMMUNIQUE

[Released to the press September 21]

1. The North Atlantic Council has concluded its Seventh Session, in which for the first time the member governments were represented by Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Economic or Finance Ministers. The new composition of the Council reflects the wide fields in which coordination is being steadily developed.

2. In an exchange of views on the world situation, note was taken of the growing confidence and strength of the Atlantic community in a world of continuing tension. The Council was informed by the Occupying Powers of the progress of discussions directed toward the establishment of a new relationship with the German Federal Republic. It was also informed of the statement made by the three foreign ministers after their meeting in Washington in which they welcomed the plan for a European Defense Community of which Germany would form part.<sup>1</sup>

3. The Council, considering that the security of the North Atlantic area would be enhanced by the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, agreed to recommend to the member governments that, subject to the approval of national Parliaments under their respective legislative procedures, an invitation should be addressed as soon as possible to the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to accede to the Treaty.

4. The Council considered the reports submitted by the military and civilian agencies of the Treaty Organization:

(a) The Standing Group reported on the establishment and development of the integrated force under General Eisenhower, and progress on other military matters.

(b) The Defense Production Board reported on the problems relating to the further development of production and recommended means of dealing with these problems.

(c) The Financial and Economic Board presented a report analyzing the economic and financial impact of the NATO defense effort with spe-

cial reference to the equitable sharing of the burden.

(d) The Council Deputies, the permanent working body of the Treaty Organization, reported on their activities in political, organization, and administrative matters and in developing closer coordination between the Treaty agencies.

(e) The Chairman of the Council Deputies summarized the major issues before the Organization and suggested action to meet them.

As a result of the study of these reports, the Council issued guidance and directives to the respective agencies concerning their future work.

5. All member governments recognize as their joint aim the building up defense forces to a sufficient level of strength, and the no less important objective of a sound and stable economy necessary to support that effort. The reports of the Defense Production Board and of the Financial and Economic Board, and the discussion thereon, have indicated a number of difficulties in the production and economic fields. The member countries recognize the need to surmount such difficulties in order to assure the continued progress of their efforts to strengthen the free world. The Council has noted the danger of inflation, the burdens which increased defense efforts place on the balance of payments, and the obstacles to an adequate defense arising from price and allocation pressures on raw material supplies. The Ministers recognized that the common effort requires a common attack upon these problems, and agreed to take such action severally and jointly as they deem appropriate to find solutions to them.

6. Accordingly a temporary committee of the Council was established to survey urgently the requirements of external security, and particularly of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defense of Western Europe, and the realistic political-economic capabilities of the member countries, with a view to determining possible courses of action for their reconciliation so as to achieve the most effective use of the resources of the member countries.

7. The Council received reports from the member governments on the status of the defense effort in their countries and referred them to the military agencies and appropriate commands for

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 486.

study and recommendations to improve the early effectiveness and availability of forces.

8. The Council noted that agreement had been reached on the financing of an "infrastructure" program of airfields, communications, and certain installations for the support of forces. These projects will continue without delay.

9. The Council has issued a separate statement making clear the importance which the member governments attach to the development of the Atlantic community, not only to safeguard their freedom and common heritage on an equal footing but also to strengthen their free institutions and to advance the well-being of their peoples. The statement announced the establishment of a ministerial committee to study and recommend lines of future action toward these objectives.

10. The Council resolved that, in order to develop more effective unity of action, and in accordance with its duties as the institution for forming the policy and directing the operations of the Treaty Organization, its meetings would be held more frequently and at more regular intervals. In order to continue progress on the problems discussed at the Seventh Session, it was agreed that a further meeting of the Council would be held in Rome in the near future.

#### STATEMENT BY THE COUNCIL

[Released to the press September 21]

The peoples of the North Atlantic community are united under the North Atlantic Treaty to preserve their freedom and to develop their common heritage of democracy, liberty and the rule of law. During the past two years, since the Treaty came into being, North Atlantic countries have joined in collective efforts for their defense. They will continue to work together closely to consolidate the North Atlantic community. All obstacles which hinder such cooperation on an equal footing should be removed.

The persistent attempts which have been made and are being made to divide the peoples of the North Atlantic community will fail. Those who made these attempts do not understand the nature or the strength of the close ties between the free peoples of the North Atlantic community. The preservation of peace is the very essence of that community, and free discussion as to how this can best be done is a source of continuing strength.

It was the threatening international situation that brought 12 nations of the North Atlantic community formally together under the North Atlantic Treaty to create sufficient strength to preserve their freedom and liberty. A series of so-called peace offers as vague in language as they are obscure in content are made from time to time. The peoples of the North Atlantic community will test these offers by the deeds that follow them. They will never reject any genuine

move for peace, but will not be deflected from building up their defensive strength by mere empty words about peace.

The strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the past two years has developed in the minds of the peoples a strong sense of their common interests and ideals. There is a desire within the North Atlantic Community to meet specific needs in all fields where close collaboration will advance the welfare of the community.

One source for the further development of the North Atlantic community is Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty which states:

The Parties will contribute towards the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

A clear sense of the direction in which the community is developing should make it easier to take practical steps towards that end.

The Council has therefore decided to set up a Ministerial Committee composed of representatives from Belgium, Canada, Italy, Netherlands and Norway, to consider the further strengthening of the North Atlantic Community and especially the implementation of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Committee, assisted by the Council Deputies, will, in particular, consider and make recommendations to the Council on the following matters:

(a) Coordination and frequent consultation on foreign policy, having particular regard to steps designed to promote peace.

(b) Closer economic, financial and social cooperation designed to promote conditions of stability and well-being, both during the period of rearmament and thereafter, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or through other agencies.

(c) Collaboration in the fields of culture and public information.

In these and other ways the Council will build up the inner strength of the North Atlantic community, without duplicating the work of other international organizations which promote the same objectives.

The Council endorses the recent declaration of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation which called on all sections of the European community to increase production and play their part in the collective effort for peace and well-being.<sup>2</sup>

In developing the North Atlantic community, the Council would act in conformity with and seek to strengthen the purposes and principles of the

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 487.



Charter of the United Nations. It is only by the work and by the enlightened understanding of the free peoples everywhere that the cause of freedom and democracy will be upheld against any challenge.

#### **PRESS STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON<sup>3</sup>**

There is an understandable feeling from time to time that when the Council meets there should be a whole series of world-shattering decisions which are made. That I think is not a proper way to approach these things, and I think one of the decisions which was taken at this meeting will be very helpful for molding these meetings into proper perspective.

We hope to have much more frequent meetings, so that each meeting in itself is not a great event. They should be held regularly, and there should be several meetings every year so that we do not pile up a lot of work and have these treated as extraordinary events. The whole machinery and operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have come a long way in the two years since it was organized, and I think that if you look back now at that day in 1949 when we signed this treaty, we really see what a tremendous advance has been made both in the operation of the treaty organization through the Council and the deputies, and also in the physical work which has gone on in the organization of the forces that is proceeding under General Eisenhower.

Then, the agreement that was reached here in Ottawa about that strange word "infrastructure" has been extremely helpful. That has to do with the basic facilities which are required for these North Atlantic forces—the air fields, communications facilities, and things of that sort.

The work has been going forward up to the present time. There has been difficulty about how the financing should be borne—should it be by each government, in respect of its particular part of these facilities, or should there be some specific division of it. That was worked out and a good agreement was reached so that the solution can be pressed to a very speedy conclusion.

We are not going to get an adequate air force until we get fields to put it on, nor an adequate command structure until there is a whole system of communication which can be used by that command structure. All those things have been done. A most important one which came about as the result of the amendment dealing with our structure was proposed by the Canadian Government, which brings in the financial, economic, and the military side.

Our meeting with the foreign ministers has enlarged the attendance in the room somewhat.

<sup>3</sup> Extemporaneous remarks made at a press conference at Ottawa on Sept. 20 and released to the press at Washington Sept. 21.

With the really brilliant performance of the Canadian Army Signal Corps in bringing about instantaneous translations, we were able to conduct these large meetings efficiently. We had real discussions, a real exchange of views, and real debates.

One of the outstanding things to me was the helpful and brilliant part played by many of the representatives of the smaller member countries. I need not enlarge upon that; you can readily know who they were. They played a very important part in the success of these meetings, through their keen observations, submission of proposals, suggestions for alterations in resolutions, and so on. There was a real, thorough, and complete discussion of all these matters, and a most worthwhile preparation for the meeting to be held in Rome sometime in November.

Another thing which was important was to appoint a group to get to work on the non-military side of this organization. All those activities could properly fall under Article II of the treaty. They have a great bearing on the thinking of people in all of our countries who are very much interested in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. People sometimes feel in some instances that the organization is too preoccupied with military considerations and should give more attention to the other side of its work. The ministerial men are taking a lead in this thinking. They will work with the deputies in London and will be ready at the time of the Rome meeting to submit to us specific ideas which have been worked out.

One of the problems here is not to duplicate the work done in other organizations, and to work out immediate programs on which we can all get to work.

Now, the main thing which was accomplished here was the conclusion on the part of all the nations to take the proper steps with their legislatures to add Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That was a matter which raised very difficult problems. These problems had to be discussed by the various representatives of their ministries, and within the respective parliaments all over the world.

All of this was far from easy, for many countries to come to a conclusion—but a unanimous conclusion was reached, and now we will go forward with the necessary legislative steps. That involves ratification by our Senate of the necessary amendment to the treaty. The treaty must be amended by adding the two countries and certain changes made describing the areas covered by the treaty.

When the Committee on Foreign Relations had its meeting two years ago, I was asked by Senator Vandenberg whether under Article X admission of new members would require ratification by the Senate. I answered then that such an amendment would constitute in effect a new treaty, and would have to be laid before the Senate, just as the origi-

nal treaty was. And so we will prepare a paper which will be signed by the officials of various governments, and when ratified will accomplish this result. That was the big, the concrete and immediate achievement of this meeting.

Other matters are not in a state of readiness for action. We hope that they will be by the next meeting, and that further steps looking toward some participation by Germany in the defense of Western Europe will be ready for consideration by the Council when we meet in November.

It had been hoped that we could have a meeting at the end of October in Rome. That will not now be possible, because of the British elections, so the next meeting will have to be postponed a little while. That will be worked out. I imagine it will be sometime toward the latter part of November. That is speculation.

I think that describes in a broad way what we have covered at this Ottawa meeting. I might say one other thing: I should not overlook the resolution appointing the 12-man committee to look into the reconciliation of military requirements with the economic availabilities and capabilities of the countries concerned. This is a problem which the organization has been working on for a long time. We have had our Defense Production Board analyzing the whole physical possibilities for production in Europe.

The Finance and Economic Board has been analyzing the effects of the rearmament program on the economic and financial structures of the various countries. A committee of the Standing Group is working on the force requirements. All of this must be put together. The deputies have a great deal to do; they are working very hard in preparation for the Rome meeting, and it was thought that the thing to do was to get a temporary group together who could work and come up with a conclusion by the latter part of November. Each man has the full confidence of his Government and represents its views in an authoritative way, and the group will come up with a recommendation which the Council can act on.

That is a matter on which the United States Government will have to get to work pretty soon because, as you know, the basic decisions on these matters have to be made in time for the President's budget message, which goes to Congress shortly after it meets in January. We have tremendous work ahead of us, which covers a great many fields. Much of it has been accomplished and is now behind us, and we have laid the foundation for the rest of it. We hope to have another meeting this year and one early next year. We will get through these problems. It will all take time and effort and ingenuity. The organization is strong and durable and moving forward, and we can be very satisfied and happy about this meeting here in Ottawa.

#### **RADIO ADDRESS BY SECRETARY ACHESON\***

It is fitting that this meeting of the North Atlantic Council should be held in Ottawa.

Among the first to see and express the need for the Atlantic nations to unite their strength in the face of the common danger were Mackenzie King and St. Laurent.

Since that time, the people of Canada and their Government have continued to give leadership and inspiration to the development of effective unity of purpose and action for peace through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Both a key geographical position and a broad world outlook contribute to Canada's prominent and significant role in the further evolution of this great experiment in international cooperation.

#### **"Growth Toward Unity"**

If I were asked to sum up the current development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I would describe it as a process of "growth toward unity."

It is sometimes the case that men may feel only the dim outlines of the historical developments of which they are a part, and I suspect that this may be true of the process of growth toward unity which we are now witnessing in this organization.

At the time of its signing, the treaty registered a unity of purpose which was already in existence. I expressed the belief then, and I am even more firmly convinced of it now, that the treaty did not create something new as much as it recorded a basic reality—a unity of belief, of spirit, and of interest—which was already felt by the nations of the North Atlantic Community.

But since the signing of the treaty, we have seen emerging an increasing unity of practice and cooperation among these nations.

There has been a steady translation into reality and action of the resolute determination expressed in the treaty by the member nations to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

What was a paper plan of defense only a year ago has now become a defense force—an integrated defense force—serving under a unified command.

Week in and week out, the deputies have been meshing national points of view into a common program of action. And the Council, as it is now organized, brings together the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and finance, thus engaging the essential branches of government of the member nations upon the common effort.

Meanwhile, many new organizations for co-operation have been emerging and developing

\* Made over Canadian Broadcasting Corp. network Sept. 18 and released to the press on the same date by the American Embassy at Ottawa.

among the nations of the European and North Atlantic areas. Among these are the Benelux Economic Union, the Schuman Plan, the European Payments Union, and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation—all of them aspects of a growing sense of community.

The present effort to establish a European defense community is now the frontier of this development, a practical advance in cooperation for which the experience of the past 2 years has prepared us.

But as we look ahead beyond the present defense efforts, it seems to me that the time has come to make clear to our respective peoples and to the world the importance which we all attach to the development of the North Atlantic Community as a framework for our progressively closer long-term association in all fields.

#### **Affirmation of Common Values**

The North Atlantic Treaty is far more than a defensive arrangement. It is an affirmation of the moral and spiritual values which we hold in common. It represents the will of the peoples of the North Atlantic Community not only to safeguard their freedom, but to seek increasing fulfillment of it. The central idea of the treaty is not a static one; it is conceived rather in the spirit of growth, of development, of progress. What we seek to preserve is the opportunity for a living heritage of freedom to continue to grow.

This broad and constructive intent is made clear in Article II of the treaty, which expresses the determination of the member nations to strengthen their free institutions, to promote conditions of stability and well-being, and to encourage economic cooperation wherever possible.

We cannot afford to lose sight of these broad objectives, even though we are compelled, by the dangers which face us, to give first priority of effort and resources to the establishment of an integrated defense.

Since security is essential to freedom and well-being, we are now obliged to devote very great effort to building our military defenses. We would be guilty of the greatest folly in history if we allowed ourselves to be content with a defensive effort less than adequate to the enormous threat which now hangs over us all.

#### **More Than Military Strength Needed**

But the threat, as we are all well aware, is more than a military one, and we recognize the necessity of building not only our military strength, but our economic, political, and social strength to the limit of our capabilities.

This aspect of our defense effort, by which we are now underpinning our military strength, is at the same time creating a basis for cooperation

which will greatly aid us in reaching our affirmative goals.

We look forward to a time when the capital expenditure of our military defenses shall have been made, and we shall then need to sustain only the lesser burden of maintaining our defenses. Even in the face of the great defense effort we have been making, considerable economic gains have been possible. But our thinking must go beyond these gains, to a time when the member nations will be able safely to concentrate their efforts on promoting the individual well-being of their people, and thus fortify the stability and vitality of their democratic institutions. This is our primary purpose, which together we shall be able to advance on the basis of the cooperation that is now being established.

We are beginning now to study the formulation of long-term concrete measures to this end.

This is the direction, I believe, in which the process of growth toward unity points for the future.

#### **Practical Solutions to Specific Problems**

But I think we must always keep in mind that this process of growth is a practical rather than a theoretical one. It is a step-by-step process. It results from a succession of practical and cooperative solutions to specific problems.

Many of the problems we have confronted in building our defenses pay no respect at all to national frontiers. Our experience in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is constantly bringing home to us the need for new ways of dealing with these problems of military organization, of production, and of finance.

Each felt need, as it has arisen, has led to cooperation in a specific way. Each such effort advances the habit of cooperation, and is woven into a fabric of community.

I stress the practical character of this process of growth toward a community sense because I believe this way offers more real progress than the pursuit of formulas which would overlap the problems immediately before us.

I think we can anticipate an increasing sense of community among the nations of Europe and North America. Our first aim is to develop a community in which the individual can be free from fear. Beyond this, we look forward to the day when a citizen from any one of our countries may travel freely and easily anywhere throughout the Atlantic Community, finding understanding and friendship, and enjoying the same basic rights and opportunities as the people he visits.

I think we can develop closer links in transportation and communications, and in the whole field of ideas. We can, I believe, anticipate an increased exchange of skills and experience between us in such matters as agriculture and industry.



There lie before us possibilities for the progressive development of closer economic collaboration, and the development of opportunities for normal trade and investment.

These are, of course, long-term matters which cannot be developed overnight. But I believe there will emerge from our Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Council clear and inspiring proof of our common determination to work in this direction. And I believe that our present efforts toward increasing coordination of our foreign policies and our common efforts toward increasing our economic productivity will stand as practical demonstrations of our intentions.

And this, in turn, is part of a larger pattern. The North Atlantic Community is but one of a series of overlapping circles which join the nations of the world in ever-closer relationships.

We can discern the same development manifesting itself in the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Organization of American States, and among

the nations newly associated in security arrangements in the Pacific area.<sup>4</sup> These groupings of nations, while adapted to the separate needs and purposes of their several states, are nevertheless interlocked with each other in a common pursuit of peace and progress.

Overarching these groups of nations stands the greater edifice of the United Nations, which continues to grow in strength and in importance, and may someday, we devoutly hope, be able to express the universal will of all nations and all people.

This, as I see it, is the larger pattern of which our efforts in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization form a part. As I said at the outset, I believe it represents a process of growth toward unity. Gradual but steady, practical rather than theoretical, these efforts move us confidently forward toward the advancement of human well-being and a time of peace.

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 147; Aug. 27, 1951, p. 335; Sept. 24, 1951, p. 486.

## The Constitution—A Means of Correcting Injustices in Human Society

*Address by the President*<sup>1</sup>

We have met here this morning to put some pieces of parchment away in specially sealed cases, in order to preserve them from physical and chemical change. These are already old documents, written in a style and a hand which are no longer familiar to us. If they were only historical relics, it might seem strange that we should make a ceremony out of this occasion of sealing them up.

But the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are more than historical relics. They are a living force in our life today.

We may have some difficulty in preserving the parchment on which these two documents have been written, but the ideas they set forth will never perish. These documents express the highest principles of political life: that all men have certain inalienable rights, that governments are set up to provide for the welfare of the people, and that the rule of law stands above government and citizen alike.

These ideas have a life of their own. They have been a dynamic force in the history of our Nation. They have inspired men, all around the world, to

create new and independent governments, and to improve the conditions under which they live.

These are very explosive documents, Dr. Evans. We may think we have them safely bottled up, but the ideas they express will go on forever. They will continue to give energy and hope to new generations of men, here and in other countries, in the long struggle to create a better society on earth.

### Revolutionary Documents

The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, when they were written, were revolutionary documents. But they were revolutionary in a very unusual sense.

Many revolutions are simply a resort to force and violence to impose a new despotism upon the people. But these documents were for a very different purpose; their aim was to make despotism impossible. Both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution seek to make the rule of law and the concepts of justice the dominating factors in government. And to a large extent they have succeeded.

The struggle against the use of naked force as an instrument of government was an old one even before these two documents were written. Our forefathers created a new nation, but they based

<sup>1</sup> Made at the Library of Congress on Sept. 17 and released to the press by the White House on the same date. The occasion was the transfer of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to new cases designed to preserve them permanently. Dr. Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress, presided at the ceremony.



it upon the long experience of the English people in maintaining human freedom.

The right to trial by jury, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, the right of habeas corpus, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the guarantees of freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion—all these were basic concepts in the days of our Revolution. They were concepts for which men had worked and even given up their lives for centuries.

But they had never been made the foundation stones of a government until they were put in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution and its first 10 amendments—the Bill of Rights—which are just as fundamental a part of our basic law as the original version of the Constitution that we are sealing up here today.

These rights have become so well established in this country that we take them for granted. They are so much a part of our lives that they may seem dry and uninteresting. But the history of other countries in recent years has shown us how vital and important they are. Recent history has demonstrated that the unrestrained use of force by government is just as great a danger to human progress now as it was ages ago. It has demonstrated that unless citizens have rights against the government, no one can be safe or secure.

### **The Tyranny of Soviet Communism**

In our own lifetime, we have learned anew the human misery that an absolute, power-mad government can create. We have seen it in the brief history of the Fascist and Nazi tyrannies. We are witnessing it today in the tyranny of Soviet communism.

A constitution is not just a matter of words. There are other constitutions which may read as well as ours. Take, for example, the constitution of the Soviet Union. That has a lot of fine language in it. The constitution of the Soviet Union says that Soviet citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly. It professes to guarantee that citizens of the Soviet Union shall be secure in their persons and in their homes. And in addition, it purports to guarantee equality, the right to work, the right to an education, the right to rest and leisure, freedom of religion, and a lot of other fine things.

But these good words in the Soviet Constitution mean less than nothing. They are empty promises, because the citizens of the Soviet Union have no way of enforcing their rights against the state.

In the Soviet Union, the power of the state is above all rights. The Government does not have to obey the law. As a result, the citizens of the Soviet Union enjoy none of the freedoms which they are guaranteed by their constitution. They

do not have freedom of speech or freedom of the press. They may be arrested without cause; their homes may be invaded without a search warrant; they may be executed or exiled without a fair trial and without appeal.

The Soviet citizens live in fear. Their society is a jungle, through which the naked power of the Government prowls like a beast of prey, making all men afraid.

The Communists claim that they have to use the weapons of tyranny in order to improve the conditions of the people. But that is not true. That is a rejection of the long experience of mankind. By resorting to the worst evils of ancient tyranny, the Soviet rulers have held their citizens in terror and bondage, while freedom is growing in the rest of the world.

And the evils which the Communists brought back into the world—the evils of political persecution and unrestrained state power—have grown and flourished, and become much more terrible than they ever were before. Modern inventions, modern means of communication, modern methods of propaganda make the power of the state more formidable than it was in the days of the stage coach and the muzzle-loading musket. The power of the Kremlin is more effective, more violent, more far reaching than the power of the Czars, or the power of Genghis Khan, or the power of other tyrants of the past.

Today, the tyrant can uproot and liquidate whole classes of people and entire nations. The death camps of Hitler Germany or of modern Siberia demonstrate that the unrestrained power of the government can be a greater evil in our modern civilization than it ever was in ancient times.

The only guarantee against such a society of fear and cruelty is the principle that the government is not above the law. Our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution proclaim that the government is subject to the fundamental law.

The Constitution sets up a system of internal checks and balances which may seem cumbersome to us at times, but which succeeds in preventing any part of the government from having absolute power. Under our Constitution, it is not only the citizens who are made to conform to the principles of justice, but the government itself. And the citizen has the power to enforce his rights against the government. The rule of law is made supreme.

### **Protection From the Evils of Tyranny**

Our Constitution protects us from the evils of tyranny. But this is not all our Constitution does. If it were, it would not be enough.

A constitution must do more than provide restraints against the illegal use of power. It must give the people a means of dealing with their day-to-day problems, of continually correcting the injustices that spring up in human society. A con-

stitution that is not adaptable—that prevents the government from acting for the general welfare of the people—will not long survive. It will become a mere historical curiosity.

Ours is not such a constitution. We have discovered, over the years, that it offers the means for correcting present evils without throwing away past gains.

There are always those who oppose necessary reforms. Such people often turn to the Constitution to justify their position. But our Constitution has seldom proved to be a barrier to changes which were needed for the welfare of all the people. Our Constitution has not set up an aristocracy of wealth or privilege. It does not serve the privileged few at the expense of the great majority of the people.

The great advances we have made in recent years in legislation to improve the condition of labor, to bring economic security to the farmer, to provide aid for the needy, to develop the resources of the country for the benefit of all, to improve the health, the education, and the housing of the average family—all these advances have been opposed in the name of the Constitution. But it never was the purpose of the Constitution to bar such advances. On the contrary, the Constitution provides the means for carrying into effect the fundamental ideas of justice and liberty and human progress on which our Government is founded.

Acting under our Constitution, we have been able to solve the problems which have driven other countries into revolution. We have been able to make necessary reforms without overthrowing the ancient guarantees of our liberty. Building on the experience of the past we have opened the way to a brighter future.

On this occasion, we ought to pray to Almighty God that the American people will remain faithful to the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. We should ask that they be ever mindful of the great wisdom and truth that are embodied in these two documents, and through them, in our form of government.

The wisdom of our form of government is that no men, no matter how good they may appear to be, may be entrusted with absolute power. The great achievement of our form of government is that it has enabled us to meet the changing needs of the people while providing a rule of law that restrains all men, even the most powerful. The glory of our form of government lies in the fact that it has held us faithful to the concept that the aims of government are human betterment and human freedom.

If the American people remember these things and understand them well, this Nation will move forward in the future as it has in the past. And these documents, which we are today sealing against physical decay, will always be remembered and cherished, finding new life in each new generation of Americans.

## Norway Signs Agreement for Mobile Hospital in Korea

Acting Secretary James E. Webb and Chargé d'Affaires Eigil Nygaard of the Norwegian Embassy, on September 17, signed an agreement under which Norway agrees to pay in dollars for the logistical support furnished by the United States to the Norwegian mobile surgical hospital participating in the United Nations operations in Korea.

This agreement will be supplemented by technical arrangements between the Department of the Army and the Norwegian Government covering administrative and accounting matters. Payments are to be made on a regular basis as vouchers are submitted by the United States to the Norwegian Government.

The Norwegian mobile surgical hospital is a 200-bed mobile-hospital unit comprising 15 nurses, 62 doctors, and enlisted men. Under the command of Col. Herman Ramstad of Bergen, Norway, the hospital unit was intensively trained at Osaka, Japan, before going into the field in July 1951. Maj. Gen. Edgar Erskine Hume, surgeon, Far East Command, recently said, "The Norwegian mobile army surgical hospital has assumed its place in the over-all medical support of the United Nations forces in Korea. They have more than proven their worth for their excellent surgery and medical care. Due to their high professional standards and their total unselfish efforts the lives of many of our gallant fighting men in Korea have been saved."

The United States has undertaken to provide this unit with the materials, facilities, supplies, and services required in Korea which the Norwegian Government is unable to furnish, either because the supplies cannot be procured elsewhere or because it is not feasible to establish separate lines of supply. This arrangement is similar to that made with other U.N. Forces participating in the Korean action.

It has been the practice of the United States to reach an understanding in principle, at the time arrangements are made for the participation of the forces of a U.N. member in Korea, that the United States would be reimbursed for the logistical support furnished. Under this procedure, the task of working out the details as to reimbursement is undertaken at a later time and does not delay the movement of personnel to Korea. A formal agreement similar to the one just signed with Norway has already been reached with Sweden.<sup>1</sup> Some of the other participating governments have been making interim payments to the United States even though they have not yet concluded formal agreements.

<sup>1</sup> For text of similar agreement with Sweden see BULLETIN of July 9, 1951, p. 75. For text of the agreement with Norway, see Department of State press release no. 834 of Sept. 17.

## The United Nations and Greece

### THE UNSCOB REPORT TO THE SIXTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

by Harry N. Howard

*The following article reviews the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (U.N. doc. A/1857), which, signed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 15, 1951, represents a basic illustration of the evolution of the Greek question in the United Nations. Like those of 1948, 1949, and 1950, the report of 1951 (a) traces the creation, function, and organization of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans; (b) outlines the conciliatory role of the Special Committee and the problem of frontier relations; (c) describes the external aid and assistance rendered to the Greek guerrilla movement during the course of the past year; (d) analyzes the refugee problem in Greece; and (e) characterizes the aggressive, subversive propaganda directed against the Greek Government. It closes with conclusions drawn from the evidence before the Special Committee and recommendations to the sixth General Assembly.*

The Greek question, in one form or another, has been before the United Nations since January 1946, and the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) has functioned in Greece since November 1947.<sup>1</sup> In view of the changed character of the problems confronting the Special Committee, it underwent a reorganization in 1951 into three *ad hoc* subcommittees to enable the Committee more efficiently to study the evidence concerning external assistance to the Greek guerrilla movement, to interrogate international refugees in Greece, and to examine and report on radio propaganda against Greece emanating particularly from the "Free Greece" radio station in Rumania.<sup>2</sup> During the course of 1950-1951 the Special Committee, in order to become better acquainted with the frontier areas with which it was dealing and to obtain first-hand information beyond that provided in the reports of its observers, made a number of visits to the frontier regions.<sup>3</sup>

#### **The Conciliatory Role of the Special Committee**

As in years past, the Special Committee noted that, because of the refusal of the northern neighbors to cooperate with it, it had not been able to fulfill its conciliatory role. Although Yugoslavia

had no official relations with the Special Committee, the report noted with satisfaction

the improvement in relations between that country and Greece through direct negotiations, as revealed by the exchange of Ministers (28 November, 1950), the signature of a postal agreement on 2 February 1951, a rail traffic agreement on 12 February 1951, an air transport agreement on 16 March 1951, and finally a trade agreement on 10 April 1951.<sup>4</sup>

It also noted with satisfaction "the continuing repatriation, with the cooperation of the International Red Cross, of a certain number of Greek children and adults." Among other things, the Special Committee called attention to "the continued improvement in Greek-Yugoslav frontier relations" but noted the "non-existence" of relations on the Greek-Albanian frontier and a few meetings between authorities on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier.<sup>5</sup> It also observed that, despite their refusal to cooperate in any way with it, Albania and Bulgaria persisted in submitting communications to the United Nations alleging violations of their frontiers by the Greek armed forces. The report declared:

These allegations thus fell directly within the terms of reference conferred upon the Special Committee by the General Assembly. Since the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria have consistently refused throughout the existence of the Special Committee

See footnotes at end of article.



to facilitate action concerning their allegations on the part of the Special Committee, the appropriate United Nations body, it is clear that their complaints were submitted to the United Nations solely for purposes of publicity. The Greek Government has submitted complaints alleging frontier violations on the part of the Albanian and Bulgarian armed forces.<sup>6</sup>

The Special Committee had evidence of a number of relatively minor incidents along both the Greek-Bulgarian and Greek-Albanian frontiers although the Greek guerrilla forces had been substantially liquidated during the course of 1949 and the character of the problems of the Special Committee, of course, had changed basically since that year. Nevertheless, a serious clash was brought to the attention of the Special Committee at the end of May 1951 on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier north of Drama when a Greek army frontier patrol was ambushed on Greek territory by a Bulgarian patrol. After exhaustive inquiry, the Special Committee concluded that the incident constituted a clear violation by the Bulgarian army of a well-marked frontier, and it seemed "impossible to believe that the Bulgarians were not aware of the fact that they were on Greek territory."<sup>7</sup> Although a number of meetings were held between Greek and Bulgarian frontier authorities with the view to settling various incidents, none of these meetings achieved any substantial results or served to improve frontier relations between the two countries.

During 1950-1951, the Special Committee continued to devote attention to problems of frontier conventions and frontier markings. It noted the "principles for the maintenance of good frontier relations," proposed in its report of 1950 and reaffirmed in February 1951, and pointed out "that the conclusion of frontier conventions was a desirable means of preventing misunderstanding and hostilities" between neighboring States.<sup>8</sup> The Committee also maintained that clear frontier markings were desirable in the same general interest, some progress in the latter direction having been made with regard to the Greek-Yugoslav frontier especially although no responses to communications from the Secretary-General to the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria with respect to this matter were ever received. Indeed the Special Committee received no indications that the Albanian Government had taken any positive steps to improve the situation along the Greek-Albanian frontier or shown any desire to cooperate with the Greek Government in the repair of border markings or the conclusion of new frontier conventions. A similar situation obtained with respect to Bulgaria.<sup>9</sup>

#### External Aid to the Greek Guerrilla Movement

Although the situation within Greece had changed substantially since the liquidation of the guerrilla forces in 1949, the Special Committee

See footnotes at end of article.

found ample evidence of external assistance to the Greek guerrilla movement. As the report noted:<sup>10</sup>

Since August, 1950, the Special Committee has witnessed a new development in the nature of the external support afforded to the Greek guerrillas and has also seen a change in tactics on the part of the Greek guerrilla movement itself. . . . During the past 12 months the guerrillas have not ventured to undertake any specifically military operations against the Greek army, and the task of the various small and scattered groups of Greek guerrillas in Thrace, Macedonia and Epirus, although armed and prepared to use their weapons when cornered by the Greek army, has been and is, in the main, of a subversive, political and propaganda nature.

Although the methods employed have changed, the primary aim of the Greek guerrilla movement remains the same: the overthrow of the Greek Government. As in the past, this aim has received the close support of Albania and Bulgaria, and the Special Committee has noted that the various groups of Greek guerrillas have been infiltrated across the Greek-Albanian and Greek-Bulgarian frontiers with the active assistance of the Albanian and Bulgarian authorities. Moreover, these groups have been fed, lodged, clothed, armed and equipped in Albania and particularly in Bulgaria with the connivance of the Governments of these two States.

But it is of particular interest that the Special Committee also obtained evidence that States other than Albania and Bulgaria, namely, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, had given assistance to Greek guerrillas in providing training facilities on their territories and later in aiding in their return to Greece. This evidence clearly showed that "a widespread and carefully coordinated system now exists for selecting, training and eventually smuggling armed subversive groups into Greece across the Albanian and Bulgarian frontiers."<sup>11</sup> The Special Committee declared:<sup>12</sup>

Therefore, the general situation is that of a subversive political drive on the part of the Greek guerrilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the Greek Government, by specially selected and trained groups under the direction of the Greek Communist Party against a background of present military passivity on the part of the bulk of the former guerrilla army. This drive is being sustained in the first instance by the direct help given by the Albanian and Bulgarian authorities and, in the second instance, by the facilities afforded in particular by the Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish authorities.

Viewed as a whole this subversive campaign, although differing from former large-scale guerrilla warfare, nevertheless retains certain military aspects and pursues the same ends. It reflects a change in tactics but not in the strategic objectives. The external direction and support that it enjoys make it evident that such a campaign presents a serious threat to Greece because, as long as it continues to be organized and reinforced from abroad, it cannot be definitely suppressed by the country's security forces. Without this assistance from abroad the guerrilla groups now operating in the northern frontier areas of Greece could neither initiate their work nor continue to carry it out.

Although the report provided some detail on Albanian and Bulgarian assistance to Greek guerrilla groups, the evidence concerning assistance by



Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania was of special interest.<sup>13</sup> For example, it was clear that in these countries indoctrination and training for sabotage and espionage, not to mention possible guerrilla action, were given, and groups were sent from these countries primarily through Rumania to Bulgaria and then into Greece. The report stated, for instance, that, although the Special Committee had no evidence of training courses in Rumania, the Committee, nevertheless, had received testimony which showed that the Rumanian authorities had "facilitated the transit of Greek guerrillas through Roumanian territory, provided accommodation for guerrilla groups in Bucharest, and, in general, condoned the operation within Roumanian territory of the specialized organization for sending guerrillas to Greece on subversive missions."<sup>14</sup> It also had evidence of a conference in Rumania in October 1950, at which leaders of the Greek Communist Party and representatives of guerrilla groups operating in Greece were present. Rumanian authorities appeared to have made ample preparations for the travel of guerrilla representatives from Greece, some witnesses indicating that representatives of the Greek guerrilla groups "were supplied with new khaki uniforms which they took back with them to Greece."<sup>15</sup>

The report also indicated that, despite the resolutions of the General Assembly in 1949 and 1950, the Special Committee had not been able to verify the disposition and disarming of Greek guerrillas who had fled across the northern Greek frontiers. Albania and Bulgaria, not to mention other eastern European countries, "deliberately disregarded the recommendations of the General Assembly" concerning this matter. No steps were taken "for the final disarming and disposition of the Greek guerrillas."<sup>16</sup> In its analysis of the nature of the task of guerrilla forces in Greece, the Special Committee pointed out that, since the defeat of the guerrilla forces in 1949, bands reentering Greece, although armed, have been instructed to avoid open clashes with the Greek National Army. The Committee stressed:<sup>17</sup>

Underground re-organization of a Greek guerrilla network, the establishment of contacts with sympathizers, and subversive political agitation designed to foment as much discontent as possible, directed ultimately, as always, at the overthrow of the Greek Government, have now become the primary aims of the Greek guerrilla movement. To enable the Greek guerrillas sent back to Greece to organize these types of subversive activities special training schools . . . were established in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Detailed instructions were given in Bulgaria prior to the crossing of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, or upon arrival in Greek territory.

It was obvious that the "activities of the Greek guerrillas in Greece" were "the culmination of those carried on through a highly organized network extending through the greater part of Eastern Europe."<sup>18</sup>

## The Problem of Refugees in Greece

As in years past, the Special Committee gave considerable attention to the problem of refugees in Greece, including international refugees, and the repatriation of Greek civilians, members of the Greek armed forces, and Greek children. The Committee found no indication of any willingness on the part of any of the states concerned, with the exception of Yugoslavia, to comply with the recommendations of the General Assembly concerning these questions.<sup>19</sup>

According to information supplied by the Greek Government, by January 31, 1951, there were 12,146 international refugees in Greece, an increase of 4,757 since June 1950, an estimate which included 11,000 refugees of Greek ethnic origin from Rumania and Albania. A majority of the refugees was centered in three camps at Lavrion, Syros, and Salonika. In the view of the Committee, the problem was more difficult for refugees of other than Greek ethnic origin, and these refugees were entering Greece across the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav frontiers at an average rate of 30 a month.

According to the Greek Government, such refugees by January 1951, included 506 from Albania, 286 from Bulgaria, 231 from Yugoslavia, and 23 from Rumania. The problem of international refugees in Greece was essentially of a "political" nature, and the committee felt that the extended stay of these political refugees was unlikely to improve relations between Greece and her northern neighbors, despite the fact that political activities on the part of these people were forbidden.<sup>20</sup>

The report of the Special Committee also dealt with the problem of the Greek civilians who, for one reason or another, had gone beyond the northern frontiers of Greece. The peaceful repatriation of all those who desired to return to Greece and to live in accordance with the law of the land had been recommended by the General Assembly in 1949. According to the Greek Red Cross, there were, by April 1, 1951, 3,150 adult Greek civilians, as distinct from guerrillas, who might be involved, 492 of whom were stated to be in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Twelve had been repatriated from Yugoslavia, but no information was received from any of the other countries as to repatriation.<sup>21</sup>

Neither had any information been received on members of the Greek armed forces who had been captured in Greece, removed by the Greek guerrillas across the frontiers, and detained in certain of the countries in Eastern Europe despite the fact that they could not be regarded as prisoners of war by the States detaining them and despite the resolution of the General Assembly of 1950 with respect to their repatriation. The Committee reported that, again with the exception of Yugoslavia, no progress had been made. The Yugoslav

See footnotes at end of article.

authorities, by January 1, 1951, had returned 63 members of the Greek armed forces who were in that country. But no reports were received indicating the return of these people from any other country, and the Albanian and Bulgarian Governments appeared completely indifferent. The Greek Red Cross, in a report of April 20, 1951, claimed that 2,950 members of the Greek armed forces had not been repatriated although 146 of these had been traced by the International Tracing Service or by the Greek Red Cross. Subsequently, on May 31, 1951, the Special Committee learned that the General Staff of the Greek Army had established a list of 3,295 names. The Special Committee felt that it could establish the precise number, identification, and location of the missing members of the Greek armed forces only with the cooperation of the States concerned.<sup>22</sup>

From the inception of the problem in 1948, the Special Committee was much concerned with the repatriation of the Greek children removed from Greece by the Greek guerrillas to the territories of the northern neighbors of Greece although the International Red Cross had a primary responsibility with regard to this problem. According to the 1951 report of the Special Committee, with the exception of Yugoslavia, which repatriated a total of 289 children between November 25, 1950, and May 25, 1951, the other states concerned made no progress in repatriating these children.<sup>23</sup> Although technical difficulties existed, they could be "overcome only with the full cooperation of the States concerned," and the Special Committee deplored the fact that, with the exception of Yugoslavia, the other States had "not only refused to furnish lists of the children in their territories, but have also failed to cooperate with the International Red Cross." The Special Committee, therefore, voiced "its deep anxiety concerning the fate of the missing children."

In this connection it is interesting to note the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies transmitted to the Secretary-General on August 3, 1951, which confirms the findings of the Special Committee.<sup>24</sup> Among other things, the report of the International Red Cross refers to the "highly and exclusively humanitarian character" of the problem of the Greek children and to the fact that the representatives of certain countries harboring these children, through the statements of their representatives at the United Nations and elsewhere, had appeared to offer a pledge of good will in this matter. The International Red Cross indicated that it had lists of 9,954 names of children claimed by their parents and that the Yugoslav Red Cross had identified 289 children who had been repatriated but that its efforts in the other countries concerned had proved fruitless. None of the other Red Cross societies concerned had sent the results of any examination of the lists for-

warded to them although they had "declared their willingness to consider them." The Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian Red Cross societies had sent no information whatever concerning the results of their comparisons of lists, and the Czechoslovakia Red Cross has apparently confined itself merely to examining the first lists received.<sup>25</sup> The International Red Cross could hardly believe, therefore, that the delay and silence were "due exclusively to technical difficulties." The International Red Cross also reported that it had "encountered insurmountable obstacles" in its attempt to make direct contact with the Red Cross societies in the harboring countries. In spite of all its representations, it "found it impossible to date to hold conversations with the Hungarian and Rumanian Red Cross societies or to pursue the preliminary talks begun with the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak Red Cross Societies" although the original effort had been made in the spring of 1949 on the basis of a unanimous resolution of the General Assembly approved in November 1948. By the end of 1949, the International Red Cross had found that "all representations to several Red Cross societies were fruitless" although an attempt was made to hold a meeting with the Red Cross societies concerned at Geneva, Switzerland, on March 9-10, 1950. A further attempt was made on March 9, 1951, with the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Czechoslovak Red Cross societies, but only the Rumanian Red Cross replied, and it took no further action on the problem. Meanwhile, as early as September 12, 1949, the Czechoslovakian Red Cross sent a list of 138 Greek children who had been identified with the list of repatriation requests received from the International Red Cross, but nothing further was done about the matter, and none of the 138 Greek children identified in Czechoslovakia was repatriated. The International Red Cross, in analyzing the difficulties arising from the terms of the resolutions of the General Assembly, declared

All the objects which we have encountered may be traced to one common cause viz., the total and regrettable absence of constructive cooperation by the majority of the Red Cross Societies in the harboring countries. The unanimous adoption of the General Assembly Resolutions, had nevertheless, led us to hope for such cooperation.

Interestingly enough, the International Red Cross indicated that, far from any desire to cooperate, certain of the countries in Eastern Europe, in their press and radio propaganda, had vehemently attacked those who were making the effort toward repatriation. Thus, the report of the International Red Cross declared:

Not only have we received no support in general for our efforts, but the few repatriations of Greek children which have been possible have formed the subject of numerous criticisms, and even of vehement accusations usually coming from persons or groups domiciled in the harboring countries.

See footnotes at end of article.

## Aggressive Propaganda Against the Greek Government

The report of the Special Committee also underlined the aggressive subversive propaganda campaign which has been directed against the Greek Government from the Soviet satellites during the course of the past year as in previous years.<sup>28</sup> It pointed out that the primary source of this campaign was the so-called "Free Greece" radio station, an official organ of the Greek Communist Party located at least since 1949 in the vicinity of Bucharest. It was significant that the center of Cominform propaganda activities was situated at Bucharest, and the Special Committee believed the Rumanian Government could "scarcely plead ignorance of the existence of the 'Free Greece' radio situation on its territory, since its location within Roumania was made known in the 1949 and 1950 reports of the Special Committee." Also noteworthy is the fact that official broadcasts of the Rumanian and of certain other governments, especially those of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, frequently repeated the propaganda of the "Free Greece" radio. One example of the type of propaganda broadcast over the "Free Greece" radio was the proclamation of the Greek Communist Party broadcast on January 23-24, 1951:

Whatever the monarcho-fascists decide to do, and whatever they do, they aim at only one thing: war and the complete and general annihilation of the people of Greece. They want to send us to the slaughter like sheep . . .

If in 1946-49 the Democratic Army of Greece had won, our troubles would now be over and we should today have been under the warm aegis of the Soviet Union, exactly the same as the other people's democracies; we should have been free to build and rehabilitate our proud and beautiful country.

The "Free Greece" radio also claimed the imminence of a Greek attack on Albania and Bulgaria and, therefore, of a Greek threat to the peace and security of the Balkan region although the Special Committee found "that there was no evidence of any aggressive designs on the part of the Greek Government against Albania or Bulgaria, and that the propaganda accusing Greece of such aggressive plans was totally unfounded." Another activity of the "Free Greece" radio was the broadcasting of Greek Communist Party resolutions and proclamations and the promotion of insurrection in Greece against the constitutional government of that country. Thus the "Fighters" seminars were broadcast regularly for the purpose of providing Communist indoctrination and giving specific instructions on subversive techniques and tactics to be employed. On February 27, for example, a "Free Greece" broadcast declared:

The objective situation is exceptionally favorable for a revolutionary movement despite the hard conditions for underground work. The KKE are collecting their forces in order to pass into the new attack . . .

See footnotes at end of article.

Amid the daily struggle for bread, work, freedom and peace the KKE's are training and preparing the army for the new decisive struggle ahead.

The Special Committee, after analyzing numerous broadcasts, considered that "the 'Free Greece' radio was employed as a medium for issuing instructions on every phase of subversive activity, with the clear intent of encouraging from outside Greece, a revolt against the Government of that country." The Committee also noted that the "Free Greece" radio had "become an instrument of a new type of attack on Greece" and that its activity constituted "a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations."

## Conclusions and Recommendations of the Special Committee

The conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee do not differ radically from those contained in its report of 1950. Among other things, the Special Committee noted the continually improved relationship between Greece and Yugoslavia although it found no basic change in Greek-Albanian or Greek-Bulgarian relations. The Committee also emphasized that no international verification had been made of the disarming and disposition of Greek guerrillas who had fled beyond the northern frontiers of Greece and that no effort, except on the part of Yugoslavia, had been made to comply with General Assembly recommendations concerning the repatriation to Greece of detained military personnel or of Greek civilians. The Special Committee also pointed out, again with the exception of Yugoslavia, that no government concerned had made any effort to "permit the return to their homes in Greece of the children whose repatriation had been requested." The Committee also took special note of the complaints of Albania and Bulgaria concerning alleged frontier violations on the part of Greece and expressed the opinion

that action should be taken to draw the attention of the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria to the fact that an appropriate United Nations body, established by the General Assembly, already exists precisely for the examination and investigation of such complaints, and that this investigation can only be carried out if those States will cooperate with the Special Committee.

As noted above, the Special Committee considered the instructions broadcast by the "Free Greece" radio station a "significant" illustration of the fact that the leadership of the guerrilla movement came from outside Greece. Although the guerrilla movement had changed its tactics since 1949 and no attempt to resume large-scale guerrilla warfare had been made, the Special Committee noted that

in openly avowed pursuance of the same ultimate aim—the forcible overthrow of the Greek Govern-



ment—the Greek guerrilla leaders have resorted to subversive agitation carried on in the frontier areas of northern Greece by small armed groups of specially selected and trained guerrillas which are under instructions to effect the underground re-organization of the Greek Communist and "Agrarian" parties, collect intelligence regarding the Greek armed forces, foment discontent, incite to insurrection, and generally prepare for a future attack to overthrow the Greek Government by force.

The Special Committee also noted its evidence concerning the network for the training of guerrillas in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania and their dispatch into Greece. Although the threat to the independence and integrity of Greece had changed in character since 1949 in view of the "tension" in the Balkans and of the "actively, hostile attitude of certain east and central European states toward Greece," the Special Committee "deemed it inadvisable to recommend its own dissolution."<sup>27</sup> Based on its experience since 1947, the Special Committee felt that the "constant vigilance of the United Nations" with regard to Greece had "been an important element in the maintenance of peace in the Balkans." The continuing threat to Greece and to peace in the Balkans could be removed only if the States concerned would act in their relations with Greece in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the recommendations of the General Assembly.

The Special Committee largely reiterated its previous recommendations concerning the Greek question (Chapter VII). Among other things, it recommended that the General Assembly

reassert the importance of maintaining peace in the Balkans and continue its efforts to eliminate the threat to Greece by considering the problem of achieving peaceful cooperation between Greece and the States from which the threat comes

and that it appropriately reaffirm its recommendations concerning assistance to the Greek guerrilla movement, the renewal of diplomatic and good-neighborly relations, the establishment of frontier conventions, and the repatriation of Greek military personnel, adult civilians, and children. The Special Committee also recommended that the General Assembly take note of the evidence concerning the existence of a network in eastern and central Europe for the training and clandestine introduction into Greece of guerrilla agents to carry on subversive activities, espionage, and sabotage for the purpose of overthrowing the Greek Government. It also urged the General Assembly to take into account the

changed but continuing threat to Greece, [and to] consider the advisability of maintaining United Nations vigilance of the Balkans in the light of the present nature of the threat to Greece in that area.

• *Mr. Howard, author of the above article, is United Nations Adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.*

See footnotes at end of article.

## APPENDIX I

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNSCOP TO THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(U.N. doc. A/1857, Chapters VI–VII)

#### Chapter VI—Conclusions

205. The dual function of conciliation and observation with which the Special Committee was charged by the General Assembly, and which the latter confirmed by resolution 382 (V) adopted on 1 December 1950, has always remained the Special Committee's constant concern. It has continued to observe the compliance or non-compliance by the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece with the recommendations of the Assembly.<sup>218</sup>

206. Full diplomatic representation between Greece and Yugoslavia was restored by an exchange of ministers on 28 November 1950. The two Governments have continued their efforts through diplomatic channels to solve their common problems, and progress is being made in the establishment of normal relations between the two Governments. A series of trade and communications agreements have been signed, and the repatriation of Greek children and other Greek nationals from Yugoslavia to Greece is proceeding. Yugoslavia has cooperated with the international Red Cross organizations and the Swedish Red Cross in making possible the progress thus far achieved. The children so far repatriated have been reunited promptly with their parents. In the light of this improvement in the situation the following paragraphs do not concern themselves with Greek-Yugoslav relations.<sup>219</sup>

207. Diplomatic and good-neighbourly relations do not exist between Albania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Greece on the other. Whereas the Government of Greece has continued to co-operate with the Special Committee in the latter's efforts to promote the establishment of such relations, the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria have persisted in their refusal to recognize it as a legally constituted body of the United Nations.<sup>220</sup>

208. In complete disregard of repeated General Assembly recommendations, those States at present accommodating the large number of Greek guerrillas known to have retreated into Albania and Bulgaria in 1949 have failed to permit any international verification of their disarming and disposition, thereby continuing a situation which constitutes a potential threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. Similarly, those States detaining Greek military personnel and other Greek nationals taken into the territories of the countries to the north of Greece as a result of the guerrilla warfare, in continued violation of accepted international practice, have made no effort to comply with the General Assembly recommendations concerning the repatriation either of such Greek military personnel, or of those other Greek nationals who desire to return to Greece and live in accordance with the law of the land.<sup>221</sup>

209. In disregard of fundamental humanitarian principles, and despite the recommendations of the General Assembly in 1948, 1949 and 1950, which sought a solution of the problem on a purely humanitarian basis divorced entirely from political considerations, the States detaining the Greek children, with the exception noted above of Yugoslavia, have made no effort to permit the return to their homes in Greece of the children whose repatriation has been requested.<sup>222</sup>

210. The problem of international refugees in Greece has undergone further development during the course of the past year. In view of the continued movement of political and other refugees across the northern frontiers into Greece, the Special Committee remains of the opinion that it would be desirable that these refugees should be resettled outside Greece.<sup>223</sup>

211. Although the Governments of Albania and Bul-



garia have consistently disregarded the recommendations made by the General Assembly with regard to co-operation by them with the Special Committee, those two Governments have continued to submit to the Secretary-General complaints alleging frontier violations. As the submission of these complaints implies recognition of the jurisdiction of the United Nations in the matter, it is the opinion of the Special Committee that action should be taken to draw the attention of the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria to the fact that an appropriate United Nations body, established by the General Assembly, already exists precisely for the examination and investigation of such complaints, and that this investigation can only be carried out if those States will co-operate with the Special Committee.

212. The "Free Greece" radio station of the Greek guerrilla movement has continued to operate from Romanian territory, transmitting instructions to the so-called "fighters" of this movement. The similarity between, on the one hand, the instructions given to guerrilla groups introduced clandestinely into Greece, as revealed by interrogation of members of these groups and, on the other hand, the instructions broadcast by the "Free Greece" station, affords a significant illustration of the fact that the leadership of the guerrilla movement comes from outside Greece.<sup>224</sup>

213. Furthermore, "Free Greece" broadcasts, accusing Greece of aggressive intentions towards Albania and Bulgaria, have been echoed by the Government-controlled propaganda emanating from certain East and Central European States. The presence of the Special Committee in Greece and the facts which it was able to establish on the spot made it possible for the Committee to affirm the groundliness of these alarmist allegations and to ensure that they were assessed by world opinion at their true value.<sup>225</sup>

214. Since the forced retreat of the guerrilla formations across the northern frontiers of Greece in 1949, the Greek guerrilla movement has changed its tactics and has not attempted to resume large-scale guerrilla warfare. In openly avowed pursuance of the same ultimate aim—the forcible overthrow of the Greek Government—the Greek guerrilla leaders have resorted to subversive agitation carried on in the frontier areas of northern Greece by small armed groups of specially selected and trained guerrillas which are under instructions to effect the underground re-organization of the Greek Communist and "Agrarian" parties, collect intelligence regarding the Greek armed forces, foment discontent, incite to insurrection and generally prepare for a future attack to overthrow the Greek Government by force.<sup>226</sup>

215. The Special Committee has obtained a considerable amount of evidence showing not only that aid to the Greek guerrilla movement has continued to come from Albania and Bulgaria, but also that it is now afforded in varying forms by other Central and East European States, in defiance of the General Assembly's injunction to Albania and Bulgaria to cease rendering any support to the Greek guerrillas, and its recommendation to all States to refrain from any action designed to assist any armed group fighting against Greece.<sup>227</sup>

216. There has been ample evidence to show that such guerrilla groups have been trained along parallel lines at special schools for Greek guerrillas in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for their subversive work in Greece. By means of a widespread and highly organized network extending from these three countries through Romania to Bulgaria, they are infiltrated secretly into Greece. The groups are instructed, equipped, and frequently also armed, in Bulgaria and then aided by the Bulgarian authorities to cross, and in some cases later to re-cross, the Greek-Bulgarian frontier. There has also been at least one characteristic instance of a similar group from Eastern Europe returning to Greece through Albania with the as-

sistance of the Albanian authorities. Without such assistance from abroad the guerrilla groups now operating in the northern frontier areas of Greece could neither initiate their work nor continue to carry it out.<sup>228</sup>

217. The threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece has thus changed in character since the retreat from Greece of the guerrilla forces in 1949. During the past year, this change has resulted in tension in the Balkans, by reason of the actively hostile attitude of certain East and Central European States towards Greece. Thus, the Special Committee has deemed it inadvisable to recommend its own dissolution.

218. It is the considered opinion of the Special Committee, based on its experience since 1947, that the constant vigilance of the United Nations with respect to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece has been an important element in the maintenance of peace in the Balkans. However, the situation depicted in the foregoing paragraphs constitutes a continuing threat to Greece and to peace in the Balkans, which can only be removed if the States concerned will act in their relations with Greece in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter and the recommendations of the General Assembly.

#### Chapter VII—Recommendations

219. In the light of the evidence before it, and of the conclusions it has drawn therefrom, and reserving its right to submit either supplementary or revised recommendations prior to the convening of the sixth session of the General Assembly if deemed advisable or necessary:

##### *The Special Committee recommends:*

1. That the General Assembly re-assert the importance of maintaining peace in the Balkans, continue its efforts to eliminate the threat to Greece by considering ways and means of achieving peaceful co-operation between Greece and the States from which this threat comes, and to that end re-affirm its recommendations to the appropriate States as to

- the cessation of all assistance or support to the Greek guerrilla movement in its activities against Greece;
- the renewal of diplomatic and good-neighbourly relations;
- the renewal, revision or establishment of frontier conventions;
- the disarming and disposition of Greek guerrillas;
- the provision of no arms and materials of war either directly or indirectly to Albania and Bulgaria until it has been determined that the unlawful assistance of these States to the Greek guerrillas has ceased;
- the repatriation of Greek military personnel, Greek children and other Greek nationals;
- the co-operation of the States concerned with the appropriate United Nations body, particularly as regards the prompt and impartial investigation of their complaints and allegations.

2. That the General Assembly take note of the evidence concerning the existence in Eastern and Central Europe of a network for the training and clandestine re-introduction into Greece of Greek guerrilla agents for the purpose of conducting subversive activities, espionage, sabotage, propaganda and underground reorganization of the Greek guerrilla movement in Greece in preparation for an attempt to overthrow the Greek Government by force.

3. That the General Assembly take into account the changed but continuing threat to Greece within the context of the hostile attitude towards Greece of a number of Eastern and Central European States, particularly Bulgaria, and the consequent tension in the Balkans.

4. That the General Assembly consider the advisability of maintaining United Nations vigilance over the Balkans in the light of the present nature of the threat to peace in that area.

See footnotes at end of article.

## APPENDIX II

### THE GREEK QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A CHRONOLOGY: 1949-1951<sup>1</sup>

1949

- September 16 . . . . . Unscob signed a supplementary report to the Fourth Session of the General Assembly (U.N. doc. A/981).
- September 28-29, October 18-  
November 3 . . . . . Discussion of the Greek Question in Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly.
- September 29 . . . . . On initiative of Australia, First Committee of General Assembly established a second Conciliation Committee, composed of President of General Assembly, Secretary-General, Chairman, and Vice-Chairman of First Committee, to explore possibilities of reaching pacific settlement between Greece and northern neighbors (U.N. doc. A/C.1/481).
- October 5 . . . . . Joint report by International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies addressed to the Secretary-General of the U.N. on repatriation of Greek Children (U.N. doc. A/1014).
- October 14 . . . . . The Greek Government accepted the proposals of the Conciliation Committee as to territorial integrity and independence based on U.N. Charter and as to establishment of Mixed Frontier Commissions, suggesting neutral Chairmen. Similarly, on October 17, Yugoslavia substantially accepted suggestions. Albania and Bulgaria did not (U.N. doc. A/C.1/506).
- October 18 . . . . . The Conciliation Committee reported that, after holding 29 meetings, it was unable to develop a basis of conciliation on which agreement could be reached between Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece (U.N. doc. A/C.1/503).
- October 22 . . . . . The Conciliation Committee reported lack of success in resolving issues, which were clarified, if not narrowed. Greece and Yugoslavia accepted tentative suggestions for draft agreements set forth by Committee on October 14. Albania and Bulgaria did not. As result of work, "agreement" in principle reached that (1) diplomatic relations be established between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania and Bulgaria, on the other; (2) frontier conventions for settlements of frontier incidents be renewed, revised or established; and (3) mixed frontier commissions be established (U.N. doc. A/C.1/506).
- November 18 . . . . . The General Assembly, by vote of 50-6-2, approved continuation of Unscob (Res. 288 (IV) A) and unanimously approved resolution on repatriation of Greek children (Res. 288 (IV) B).
- December 10 . . . . . President Romulo stated in General Assembly that, in light of conversations of Conciliation Committee with representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece, prospects for peace were encouraging and he was confident of progress "if all parties abide in good faith by resolutions of the General Assembly and the provisions of the Charter." He also thought that the fact that there had been no executions in Greece since enactment of leniency legislation was happy augury that "attitudes of humanitarianism and tolerance, compatible with security and public order," could not "but help to facilitate the work of conciliation which must eventually take place among the States involved in this problem." (U.N., 4th Sess., G. A., *Official Records*, Plenary Meetings, p. 276.)
- December 22 . . . . . In communication to Unscob, repeated to Secretary-General on January 2, 1950, Greek Government announced readiness: (1) to make renewed endeavors to settle all differences with Yugoslavia; (2) to re-establish good-neighborly relations with Albania and Bulgaria; and (3) to renew previously operative conventions with northern neighbors or to conclude new ones (U.N. docs. A/AC.16/887, 902, 903; A/1307, pars. 32-33).

1950

- February 21 . . . . . Unscob asked Secretary-General to remind governments of Poland and U.S.S.R. that seats continued to be held open for them (U.N. doc. A/1307, par. 17; A/AC.16/923). Letters of Secretary-General despatched on March 6, but no replies ever received (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1016).
- March 5-13 . . . . . Unscob made tour of frontier area of Greece, visiting Drama, Komotinia, Salonika, Florina, and other places (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/949/Rev. 1).
- March 18 . . . . . Albanian Government, in communication to Secretary-General, reiterated views as to Unscob, denounced Unscob reports, charged Greece with hostility and with frontier provocations (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/995). Albania ready for peaceful settlement of differences provided Greece renounced "territorial aspirations."
- April 8 . . . . . Bulgarian Government charged failure to restore normal relations resulted solely from Greek refusal to recognize frontiers between Greece and Albania as final, and charged Greece with numerous frontier incidents (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/982).
- April 13, 24 . . . . . Greek Government estimated that 1,713 members of Greek armed forces, captured by guerrillas, were in territories of northern neighbors of Greece (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/879, 936, 945).
- April 27 . . . . . Marshal Tito stated there was possibility of improving relations between Yugoslavia and Greece, indicating Yugoslavia would send new envoy to Greece (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/Monitor 37, 38).

<sup>1</sup> For a similar chronology for the period 1946-1949, see H. N. Howard, *Greece and the United Nations, 1946-1949*, Department of State publication 3645, pp. 28-31.

1950—Continued

- April 29 . . . . . Premier Plastiras stated Greek desire for normal relations with Yugoslavia, indicating Greece would appoint new Minister to Yugoslavia (U.N. doc. A/1307, par. 45).
- May 21 . . . . . Greece and Yugoslavia agreed to exchange of Ministers (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/Monitor 37, 38).
- June 2-13 . . . . . Unscob made frontier visit in northern Greece along Albanian-Greek and Bulgarian-Greek frontiers (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1056).
- June 20 . . . . . Unscob requested the Secretary-General to draw the attention of the governments concerned to the detention of the soldiers of the Greek National Army, captured by the Greek guerrillas and taken into the countries to the north of Greece (U.N. doc. A/1307, pars. 182-186; A/AC.16/1035).
- July 18 . . . . . Unscob advised U.N. Secretary-General that Cominform country charges of aggressive intentions on part of Greek Government were "entirely devoid of truth" (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1049).
- July 31 . . . . . Unscob signed report at Geneva, Switzerland, calling attention to altered character in threat to Greece and recommending continued vigilance (U.N. doc. A/1307).
- September 11-15 . . . . . Unscob made third visit to frontier area at Konitsa, Kastoria, and Komotini (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/W.128).
- September 19 . . . . . The Secretary-General communicated with Yugoslav Delegation concerning detained Greek military personnel, requesting it to see what could be done about problem (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1086 and annex I).
- October 9 . . . . . Unscob special report on situation on Greek-Albanian frontier circulated to members of General Assembly, dated September 8 (U.N. doc. A/1423).
- November 28 . . . . . Full diplomatic relations between Greece and Yugoslavia were restored with exchange of Ministers.
- December 1 . . . . . The General Assembly approved three resolutions in Greek case: (1) Repatriation of Greek military personnel, by vote of 53-6-1; (2) continuation of Unscob, by vote of 53-6-0; (3) repatriation of Greek children, by vote of 50-0-5 (Res. 382 (V), A, B, C).

1951

- January 23 . . . . . The Greek Communist Party stated in proclamation: "If in 1946-49 the Democratic Army of Greece had won, our troubles would now be over and we should today have been under the warm aegis of the Soviet Union, exactly the same as the other people's democracies. . . ." (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/Monitor/80).
- February 2 . . . . . Greece and Yugoslavia signed an agreement for the reestablishment of postal, telephonic, and telegraphic communications.
- February 12 . . . . . Greece and Yugoslavia signed an agreement for the reestablishment of railway service, to be effective on February 15, 1951.
- October 12 . . . . . Unscob sent materials to Secretary-General for information of General Assembly on problem of Evros Island (U.N. doc. A/1438 and Add. 1).
- November 3 . . . . . Submission of Report of International Committee of Red Cross and League of Red Cross Societies (September 18, 1950) and Report of Secretary-General on question of repatriation of Greek children to General Assembly in which failure to achieve substantial results is noted (U.N. doc. A/1480).
- November 10-14 . . . . . Discussion of Greek case in the Political and Security Committee at Fifth Session of General Assembly.
- November 24 . . . . . Fifty-five members of Greek National Army repatriated from Yugoslavia; 52 on November 7 and 3 on November 24. Greek Red Cross indicated that 2,950 remained to be repatriated from various Balkan countries, only 146 of whom identified by April 1, 1951 (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/SR.230/Add. 1, A/AC.16/1128, 1148). Subsequently 211 were identified (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1251).
- November 25 . . . . . The President of the Greek Red Cross reported to the President of the International Red Cross on the transfer of 21 Greek children at Termanya Banya, Yugoslavia (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/INF.25/Rev. 1).
- February 27 . . . . . Unscob approved a program of activities for year 1951, based on observational and conciliatory functions, in accordance with terms of reference (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1172).
- March 15 . . . . . Greece and Yugoslavia signed agreement for the restoration of air communications.
- March 20 . . . . . In communication to Secretary-General, Unscob indicated desire for cooperation of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Secretary-General transmitted communication on April 4 (U.N. docs. A/AC.16/1172, 1186, 1205, 1217). Similar communications, same dates, sent with respect to Soviet and Polish participation in work of Special Committee (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1187, 1203).
- April 11-13 . . . . . Unscob visited Albanian-Greek frontier area in neighborhood of Kastoria and expressed conviction that there was "no evidence of any aggressive designs against Albania on the part of the Greek Government and the propaganda emanating from foreign radio and press sources accusing Greece of hatching aggressive plans was totally unfounded" (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1241).
- April 17 . . . . . On visit to Athens, Secretary-General Trygve Lie met with Unscob.
- May 5 . . . . . Delegation of U.S.S.R. to U.N. returned U.N. Secretariat communication of April 18, together with Unscob communication of March 20 as to par. 10 of Res. 288 (IV) as to the repatriation of detained Greek nationals, noting that it contained "slandrous and entirely unfounded statements" (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1697, 1244).
- May 7-11 . . . . . Unscob visited Greek-Bulgarian frontier area, finding there was no basis "whatsoever for the Cominform propaganda allegations that Greece has aggressive designs" (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1236).



May 24 . . . . .	214 Greek children were returned to Greece from Yugoslavia (A/AC.16/1252).
May 27 . . . . .	According to UNSCOP Bulgarian Army clearly violated Greek territory over well-marked frontier, one Greek soldier being killed and another wounded. It was impossible "to believe that the Bulgarians were not aware of the fact that they were on Greek territory" (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/O/G-B/76/SI/Concls).
June 15 . . . . .	Commenting on Soviet communication of May 22, 1951, to President of General Assembly, UNSCOP noted that in case of 21 children repatriated on 25 November 1950, 54 repatriated on March 14, 1951 and 214 repatriated on May 24, from Yugoslavia, representatives of International Red Cross had stated that "the children were promptly re-united with their parents in Greece" (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1245, 1252).
August 3 . . . . .	The International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies transmitted memorandum to U.N. Secretary-General indicating that, with exception of Yugoslavia, it had had no success in repatriation of Greek children. In view of lack of cooperation, it was impossible to hold conversations or meetings with satellite Red Cross societies, obstacles encountered being "insurmountable," delays and silence not being due "exclusively to technical difficulties" (U.N. doc. A/1848).
August 15 . . . . .	UNSCOP signed its report to Sixth General Assembly, which was officially released on September 16, 1951. Among other things, report noted its view that "the constant vigilance of the United Nations with respect to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" had "been an important element in the maintenance of peace in the Balkans," indicating that the threat could be removed only "if the States concerned" would "act in their relations with Greece in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and the recommendations of the General Assembly" (U.N. doc. A/1857).

## FOOTNOTES:

<sup>1</sup> For previous UNSCOP reports see especially U.N. docs. A/574, 644, 692, 935, 981, 1307. See also H. N. Howard, "The Greek Question in the Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations," BULLETIN of Feb. 26, 1951, p. 333.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/1857, pars. 19-21.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pars. 22-24.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 30. Typical of past and current Cominform propaganda against UNSCOP was the broadcast from Tirana, Albania, on Sept. 5, 1951, which included an article from *Zeri i Popullit* on "UNSCOP, War Agency," which stated that the 1951 UNSCOP report was "full of lies about Albania and Bulgaria," that UNSCOP "has acted as an instrument of provocation, espionage, and war in the Balkans in the service of the State Department," that the United Nations "must reject these lying reports, fabricated by an illegal body created by the Anglo-US majority to conceal its belligerent activities," and "must dissolve this commission designed to light new fires in this part of the world."

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 64.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 32. As early as Mar. 17, 1948, the Albanian Government itself declared that its communications to the Secretary-General were "presented solely for the information of the Secretary-General of the U.N. and of public opinion," not for examination by UNSCOP or any other U.N. body (U.N. doc. A/574, par. 118). For detailed calendar of alleged incidents on Greek-Albanian and Greek-Bulgarian frontiers, August 1950-June 1951, see U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1261.

<sup>7</sup> U.N. doc. A/1857, pars. 48-49.

<sup>8</sup> U.N. doc. A/1307, annex IV; A/1857, par. 65. See also U.N. doc. A/CN.4/48, report of the International Law Commission covering its 3d session, May 16-July 27, 1951, chap. III.

<sup>9</sup> U.N. doc. A/1857, pars. 66-70A.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 71-72.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 74.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pars. 75-76.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pars. 113-134.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 130.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 131.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pars. 142-147.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 148.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pars. 148-152.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. IV, pars. 153-165.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pars. 153-164. For more detailed study see U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1227.

<sup>21</sup> U.N. doc. A/1857, pars. 165-169.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pars. 170-174.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pars. 175-183.

<sup>24</sup> U.N. doc. A/1848.

<sup>25</sup> Curiously enough, however, the Soviet representative to the United Nations, Yakov Malik, on Aug. 22, 1951, was able to furnish an evidently verified list of 83 names furnished by "Greek emigrants residing in Czechoslovakia," who sought the "repatriation" of their children from Yugoslavia to Czechoslovakia (U.N. doc. A/1871). See also U.N. doc. A/1876 for Greek comment.

<sup>26</sup> U.N. doc. A/1857, pars. 184-204.

<sup>27</sup> See also the *White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania Toward Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 1951), and the Yugoslav complaint against Albania, on Sept. 11, 1951 (U.N. doc. A/1875), for other aspects of Balkan tension.

<sup>28</sup> See chapter II, pars. 25-30.

<sup>29</sup> See chapter II, par. 30; chapter IV, pars. 175-183.

<sup>30</sup> See chapter II, pars. 25-30.

<sup>31</sup> See chapter III, pars. 142-147; chapter IV, pars. 165-174.

<sup>32</sup> See chapter IV, pars. 175-183.

<sup>33</sup> See chapter IV, pars. 155-164.

<sup>34</sup> See chapter V, pars. 184-203.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> See chapter III, pars. 71-152.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

## References

For background on the Greek case, see especially: Harry N. Howard, *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, Department of State publication 2909; *The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece*, Department of State publication 2986, BULLETIN Supplement of December 7, 1947; "The Problem of Greece in the Third Session of the General Assembly," *Documents and State Papers*, January 1949, Department of State publication 3438; *Greece and the United Nations, 1946-1949*, Department of State publication 3645; *The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations*, Department of State publication 3785; *Report of UNSCOP to the General Assembly: A Summary Account*, BULLETIN of September 4, 1950; "The Greek Question in the Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations," BULLETIN of February 26, 1951, pages 333-348.



## Documents Relating to Henry A. Wallace's Visit in China, 1944

[Released to the press by the White House September 23]

### **PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO VICE PRESIDENT ALBEN BARKLEY**

SEPTEMBER 22, 1951

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT:

I am sending you a copy of a letter, together with certain documents, which I recently received from Mr. Henry A. Wallace.

These papers deal with the facts of Mr. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944, and the part played by his advisers on that trip. These papers deal with certain matters which may be of interest to the Senate and its Committees. I am therefore making Mr. Wallace's letter available to you for use in such ways as you deem appropriate.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

### **LETTER FROM HENRY A. WALLACE TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

FARVUE, SOUTH SALEM, NEW YORK.

*September 19, 1951.*

During the last three weeks there has been considerable newspaper and radio controversy as to what part John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore played in my trip to the Far East in 1944. This controversy arose from certain testimony before the Senate Committee on Internal Security during August. Therefore I have decided to make available to you for what disposition you care to make of it the complete file of my reports to President Roosevelt on my Far Eastern trip in 1944. Parts of these reports were at one time looked on as secret but with the situation as it is today there is no reason why these reports should not be made available to the public. I shall, of course, take no steps to publish this letter myself but I wish you to feel completely free to handle it in any way which you deem will best minister to the welfare of the United States.

The following comments as well as the documents themselves should clear up any confusion as to what I was trying to do in China. The part

of various individuals in my trip will also be made more clear. In March of 1944 I wrote Secretary Hull asking him to designate someone to accompany me on the projected trip and the State Department named John Carter Vincent, then Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. The OWI sent Owen Lattimore to handle publicity matters in China. I passed through Soviet Asia on my way to China but China where the situation was critical, formed the sole subject of my recommendations to President Roosevelt. These recommendations were contained in two related documents:

First, a message drafted in Kunming, China on June 26, 1944, but which because of difficulties of communication from Kunming, was cabled to the President from New Delhi on June 28, 1944. This was divided into two parts, the first part being a quick résumé of the political situation in China and of my talks in the days immediately preceding with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; and the second part, a résumé of the military situation, its implications and requirements.

Second, a formal report to President Roosevelt covering whole trip, including also certain longer term proposals about American policy in China which I presented in person at the White House on July 10, 1944.

These were the only documents originated by me and contained all recommendations of mine resulting from the trip. Mr. Vincent, of course, transmitted to the State Department the detailed, reportorial account of my conversations with the Generalissimo which have already been published in the State Department White Paper.

There has been testimony before the Senate Internal Security Committee that Messrs. Vincent and Lattimore were members of the Communist Party at that time and were relied on by the party leadership to "guide" me along the party line. Hence it is important to specify the parts that these two men took in the recommendations that I presented to President Roosevelt. As to Mr. Lattimore, he had no part whatever. He did not contribute to and to the best of my knowledge knew nothing about either the cable from New Delhi or

the formal report to the President delivered in Washington. He offered me no political advice at any time sufficiently significant to be recalled now, and when we were together, he talked chiefly about scholarly subjects of common interest such as the history of Chinese agriculture and the relationship of the nomadic tribes with the settled peasantry.

Mr. Vincent as the designated representative of the State Department was naturally consulted by me when we were travelling together. Aside from serving as reporter at the meetings with Chiang Kai-shek, his most important part was his assistance in the preparation of the two-part cable sent from New Delhi. In Kunming, the knowledge I had already gained in Chungking of the urgency of the Chinese situation, and of the grave dangers of the Japanese offensive then going on in East China was heavily underlined by General C. L. Chennault's presentation to me of the current military picture. In the light of this presentation and in response to Chiang Kai-shek's request made of me on June 24 I decided to cable President Roosevelt on June 26. Mr. Vincent joined in the advance discussions of the projected cable, was present while it was drafted and concurred in the result. The finished cable was, of course, mine but I was disturbed by the fact that I was making far-reaching recommendations without having had an opportunity to consult the Theater Commander, General Joseph Stilwell. My recommendations were so drastic that Vincent would certainly have urged that I get in touch with General Stilwell if he (Vincent) had had objections. Instead Vincent concurred in the cables of June 28.

On the other hand, as both Mr. Vincent and Secretary of State Dean Acheson have stated, Mr. Vincent took no part in the preparation of my formal report to President Roosevelt on July 10 and to the best of my knowledge was not aware of its contents. I wrote the July 10 report myself and went alone to the White House to present it to the President. In doing the work of writing I made use of various memoranda which had accumulated during the journey, some no doubt from Vincent. However, the strongest influence on me in preparing this final report of July 10 was my recollection of the analyses offered me by our then Ambassador to China, Clarence E. Gauss, who later occupied one of the Republican places on the Export-Import Bank Board.

With regard to the two-part Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28, it should be said that the military recommendations contained therein were the most important contribution I made while in China. These recommendations were that *China be separated* from the command of General Stilwell, that General Wedemeyer should be considered in the choice of a new military commander in China, and that the new commander should be given the additional assignment of "*Personal*

*representative*" of the President at Chungking. The name and record of General Wedemeyer are enough to indicate that the purport of these recommendations was the opposite of pro-communist.

Some months later the change of military command I proposed to the President was carried out at the most urgent plea of Chiang Kai-shek. History suggests that if my recommendations had been followed when made, the Generalissimo would have avoided the disasters resulting from the Japanese offensive in East China later that summer. And if Chiang's government had thus been spared the terrible enfeeblement resulting from these disasters, the chances are good the Generalissimo would have been ruling China today.

The political section of the Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28 should be read with the atmosphere of that time in mind. Much emphasis had been placed from the very beginning of the war on the primary importance of "beating the Japs", and by the spring of 1944 even the most conservative American publications were urging that the Chinese communists could contribute substantially to this end. Roosevelt talked to me before I left, not about political coalition in China, but about "getting the two groups together to fight the war". Chiang Kai-shek for internal political reasons had, on his own initiative so I was informed, opened talks between the Nationalists and the Communists but, so he told me, with no prospect for success. When I cabled the President that "the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek towards the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long term settlement" I was referring not to "political coalition" but to this "military problem" of "getting the two groups together to fight the war." On the other hand, when I said that the "disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways which you will understand", I was, of course, warning against the possibility of a Communist political triumph in China.

The July 10 report does not recommend any political coalition between the government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese communists. It was written, however, against a Chinese political background which is still quite unknown to most Americans. In brief, one of the worst of several ills from which the Chungking government was suffering at the time, was the absolute control of all positions of political, military and economic power by an extreme pro-Asian, anti-American group within the Kuomintang. This was much emphasized by Ambassador Gauss who plainly stated that this group in Chungking was doing the Chinese communists' work for them. The more Western-minded, more efficient and more pro-American Chinese Nationalist leaders had been so completely driven from power that Dr. T. V.

Soong's appearance as interpreter at my talks with the Generalissimo was authoritatively reported to be his first emergence from a sort of informal house arrest, while the most highly praised of the Chinese Generals, General Chen Cheng, now Prime Minister in Formosa, had been dismissed from all command some months before. These facts are hinted at in my report to Roosevelt on July 10 in which it is noted as "significant" that "T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions (with the Generalissimo) except as interpreter", while General Chen Cheng is mentioned along with Generals Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-hsi as the sort of men who might rally the Chinese armies to greater efforts.

In this concluding section of this final report to President Roosevelt on July 10, a coalition is in fact suggested but not with the Communists. Instead President Roosevelt is urged to use American political influence to "support" the "progressive banking and commercial leaders," the "large groups of western trained men", and the "considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry." In short I urged President Roosevelt to help the Generalissimo's government to help itself, by bringing back to power the better men in the Chinese Nationalist ranks. These better and more enlightened Nationalists, being more able to stand on their own feet, were somewhat more independent of the Generalissimo than the extreme pro-Asia groups. Hence it was necessary to point out to President Roosevelt that if the desired changes were made in the Chinese Nationalist government, the Generalissimo's future would depend on his "political sensitivity", and his ability to make himself the real leader of the reconstituted administration. Internal reform at Chungking was, in short, my proposed means of avoiding the "revolution" and insuring the "evolution" that are referred to earlier in this report of July 10. It is worth noting that the Generalissimo must have been thinking along parallel lines, since the extremists began to lose their control and Dr. Soong and General Chen Cheng were brought back to power by the Generalissimo himself during the same month that I rendered my report to President Roosevelt.

Such were the recommendations, such was the direction of the influence of my trip to the Far East in the spring of 1944. During the years immediately following the end of the war my thinking about Chinese problems underwent a sharp change. My views during this later period are known as are now my views in 1944. Recent events have led me to the conclusion that my judgment in 1944 was the sound judgment. I append herewith a copy of the two-part Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28 in the War Department paraphrase given to me when I returned to Washington and of the final report to President Roosevelt of July 10 as presented by me to him.

## SUMMARY REPORT OF VICE PRESIDENT WALLACE'S VISIT IN CHINA<sup>1</sup>

JULY 10, 1944

Our first stop in China was at Tihua (Urumchi), capital of Sinkiang province. The Governor, General Sheng Shih-tsai, is a typical warlord. The Government is personal and carried out by thorough police surveillance. Ninety percent (90%) of the population is non-Chinese, mostly Uighur (Turki). Tension between Chinese and non-Chinese is growing with little or no evidence of ability to deal effectively with the problem. General Sheng, two years ago pro-Soviet, is now anti-Soviet, making life extremely difficult for the Soviet Consul General and Soviet citizens in Sinkiang.

There seems little reason to doubt that the difficulties in the early spring on the Sinkiang-Outer-Mongolia border were caused by Chinese attempts to resettle Kazak nomads who fled into Outer-Mongolia, were followed by Chinese troops who were driven back by Mongols. The Soviet Minister in Outer-Mongolia stated that Mongolian planes bombed points in Sinkiang in retaliation for Chinese bombings in Outer-Mongolia. He did not appear concerned regarding the situation now.

Soviet officials placed primary responsibility on General Sheng for their difficulties in Sinkiang but our Consul at Tihua and our Embassy officials felt that Sheng was acting as a front for Chungking, willingly or unwittingly. Sinkiang is an area which will bear close watching.

Due to bad weather at Chungking, we stopped for two hours at the large 20th Bomber Command (B-29) airfield near Chengtu. The first bombing of Japan had taken place only a few days before. We found morale good but complaint was freely made of inability to obtain intelligence regarding weather and Japanese positions in north China and leak of intelligence to the Japanese.

Summary of conversations with President Chiang Kai-shek is contained in a separate memorandum. Principal topics discussed were: (1) Adverse military situation which Chiang attributed to low morale due to economic difficulties and to failure to start an all-out Burma offensive in the spring as promised at Cairo; (2) Relations with the Soviet Union and need for their betterment in order to avoid possibility of conflict (Chiang, obviously motivated by necessity rather than conviction, admitted the desirability of understanding with USSR, and requested our good offices in arranging for conference); (3) Chinese Government-Communist relations, in regard to which Chiang showed himself so prejudiced against the communists that there seemed little prospect of satisfactory or enduring settlement as a result of the negotiations now under way in

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by Mr. Wallace to President Roosevelt on July 10, 1944.



Chungking; (4) Dispatch of the United States Army Intelligence Group to north China, including Communist areas, to which Chiang was initially opposed but on last day agreed reluctantly but with apparent sincerity; (5) Need for reform in China, particularly agrarian reform, to which Chiang agreed without much indication of personal interest.

It was significant that T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions except as an interpreter. However, in subsequent conversations during visits outside of Chungking he was quite outspoken, saying that it was essential that something "dramatic" be done to save the situation in China, that it was "five minutes to midnight" for the Chungking government. Without being specific he spoke of need for greatly increased United States Army air activity in China and for reformation of Chungking government. He said that Chiang was bewildered and that there were already signs of disintegration of his authority. (Soong is greatly embittered by the treatment received from Chiang during the past half year.)

Conversations with Ambassador Gauss and other Americans indicated discouragement regarding the situation and need for positive American leadership in China.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent called on Dr. Sun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun had little to contribute. He was obviously on guard. Madame Sun was outspoken. She described undemocratic conditions to which she ascribed lack of popular support for government; said that Dr. Sun Fo should be spokesman for liberals who could unite under his leadership; and advised Mr. Wallace to speak frankly to President Chiang who was not informed of conditions in China. Madame Sun's depth and sincerity of feeling is more impressive than her political acumen but she is significant as an inspiration to Chinese liberals. Dr. Sun Fo does not impress one as having strength of character required for leadership but the fact that he is the son of Sun Yat-sen makes him a potential front for liberals.

Mr. Vincent talked with Dr. Quo Tai-chi, former Foreign Minister and for many years Ambassador in London, and to K. P. Chen, leading banker. They see little hope in Chiang's leadership. Dr. Quo spoke in support of Sun Fo under whom he thought a liberal coalition was possible. Quo is an intelligent but not a strong character. K. P. Chen said that economic situation had resolved itself into a race against time; that new hope and help before the end of the year might be effective in holding things together.

Conversations with other Chinese officials in Chungking developed little of new interest. The Minister of Agriculture (Shen Hung-lieh, who incidentally knows little about agriculture) showed himself an outspoken anti-communist. General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of War, also an anti-communist, is influential as a political

rather than a military general. Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, a leading reactionary party politician, also had little to say. Ironically, he took Mr. Wallace to visit the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives which he is endeavoring to bring under his control to prevent their becoming a liberalizing social influence.

Conversations with provincial government officials were also without much significance. As an indication of political trends, there were unconfirmed reports that the provincial officials in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces were planning a coalition to meet the situation in the event of disintegration of central government control. In Szechuan province the Governor, Chang Chun, is a strong and loyal friend of President Chiang. The loyalty of military factions, however, is uncertain. In Kansu province the Governor, Ku Cheng-lun, is a mild appearing reactionary who, during his days as Police Commissioner in Nanking, earned the title of "bloody Ku."

Developments subsequent to conversations with Generals Chennault and Vincent in Kunming and Kweilin have confirmed their pessimism with regard to the military situation in east China. There was almost uniform agreement among our military officers that unification of the American military effort in China, and better coordination of our effort with that of the Chinese, was absolutely essential. It was also the general belief that, the Japanese having during recent months made China an active theatre of war, it was highly advisable to take more aggressive air action against such Japanese bases as Hankow, Canton, Nanking and Shanghai. However, the factor of loss of Chinese life at those places was recognized as an important consideration. It was the consensus that Chinese troops, when well fed, well equipped, and well led, can be effectively used. A number of Chinese generals were mentioned as potentially good leaders. Among them were Generals Chen Cheng, Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chunghsi.

In Outer-Mongolia there is considerable evidence of healthy progress, military preparedness, and nationalistic spirit. Soviet influence is without doubt strong but political and administrative control appear to be in the hands of capable Mongols. Any thought of resumption of effective Chinese sovereignty would be unrealistic. On the contrary, it is well to anticipate considerable agitation in Inner-Mongolia for union with Outer-Mongolia after the war.

Specific conclusions and recommendations regarding the situation in China were incorporated in telegrams dispatched from New Delhi on June 28 (copies attached).

We should bear constantly in mind that the Chinese, a non-fighting people, have resisted the Japanese for seven years. Economic hardship and uninspiring leadership have induced something akin to physical and spiritual anemia.

There is wide-spread popular dislike for the Kuomintang government. But there is also strong popular dislike for the Japanese and confidence in victory.

Chiang, a man with an oriental military mind, sees his authority threatened by economic deterioration, which he does not understand, and by social unrest symbolized in Communism, which he thoroughly distrusts; and neither of which he can control by military commands. He hoped that aid from foreign allies would pull him out of the hole into which an unenlightened administration (supported by landlords, warlords and bankers) has sunk him and China.

Chiang is thoroughly "eastern" in thought and outlook. He is surrounded by a group of party stalwarts who are similar in character. He has also, reluctantly, placed confidence in westernized Chinese advisers (his wife and T. V. Soong are outstanding examples) with regard to foreign relations. Now he feels that foreign allies have failed him and seeks in that and the "communist menace" a scapegoat for his government's failure. His hatred of Chinese communists and distrust of the USSR cause him to shy away from liberals. The failure of foreign aid has caused him to turn away from his uncongenial "western" advisers and draw closer to the group of "eastern" advisers for whom he has a natural affinity and for whom he has been for years more a focal point and activating agent of policy than an actual leader.

At this time, there seems to be no alternative to support of Chiang. There is no Chinese leader or group now apparent of sufficient strength to take over the government. We can, however, while supporting Chiang, influence him in every possible way to adopt policies with the guidance of progressive Chinese which will inspire popular support and instill new vitality into China's war effort. At the same time, our attitude should be flexible enough to permit utilization of any other leader or group that might come forward offering greater promise.

Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run post-war China. The leaders of post-war China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter.

#### *Possible Policy Line Relative to Liberal Elements In China*

Our policy at the present time should not be limited to support of Chiang. It is essential to remember that we have in fact not simply been supporting Chiang, but a coalition, headed by Chiang and supported by the landlords, the warlord group most closely associated with the landlords, and the Kung group of bankers.

We can, as an alternative, support those elements which are capable of forming a new coalition,

better able to carry the war to a conclusion and better qualified for the post-war needs of China. Such a coalition could include progressive banking and commercial leaders, of the K. P. Chen type, with a competent understanding both of their own country and of the contemporary Western world; the large group of western-trained men whose outlook is not limited to perpetuation of the old, landlord-dominated rural society of China; and the considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry.

The emergence of such a coalition could be aided by the manner of allotting both American military aid and economic aid, and by the formulation and statement of American political aims and sympathies, both in China and in regions adjacent to China.

The future of Chiang would then be determined by Chiang himself. If he retains the political sensitivity and the ability to call the turn which originally brought him to power, he will swing over to the new coalition and head it. If not, the new coalition will in the natural course of events produce its own leader.

#### **VICE PRESIDENT WALLACE'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT<sup>2</sup>**

[Paraphrase]

##### *Message No. 1.*

The discussions between the representative of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking but the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement. Chiang has assured me that only "political" measures will be used to reach a settlement.

Chiang expressed a desire for an improvement in relations with Russia and for our assistance in bringing about a meeting of representatives of China and Russia. I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.

The economic, political and military situations in China are extremely discouraging. The morale of the Chinese is low and demoralization is a possibility with resulting disintegration of central authority. With regard to the economic situation, there is little that we can do, and the Chinese appear incapable of coping with it. However, a general collapse does not seem imminent. Instability and tenseness characterize the political situation with a rising lack of confidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang. With regard to the military situation, I can only say that it might be worse. It is critical in Hunan Province. Potentialities and plans are in existence for stiffening

<sup>2</sup> Drafted at Kunming on June 26, 1944, and dispatched from New Delhi about June 28.

China's defense south of the city of Hengyang but there is a serious threat that east China may be severed from contact with west China. Morale in remaining free China would of course be affected by such a development.

Prior to the receipt of your message of June 23 on the subject of a U. S. Army observer group proceeding to north China to obtain military intelligence, Chiang had informed me of his agreement to the dispatch of the group as soon as it could be organized. After receipt of your telegram I again discussed the matter in detail with Chiang. General Ferris, Chief of Staff in charge of General Stilwell's Headquarters at Chungking, was present and we obtained what should prove to be the full cooperation of Chiang in arranging for the early dispatch and effective operation of the group.

Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation; bewildered regarding the economic situation, and, while expressing confidence in his army, distressed regarding military developments. Current military reverses are attributed by him to low morale caused by economic difficulties. He is convinced that a general offensive in Burma early this year would have bolstered the Chinese will to resistance and have prevented military reverses. He has assured me that the Chinese will continue to resist to the limit of their ability but he displays discouragement rather than optimism.

Our need is vital for a more vigorous and better coordinated United States Government representation in China. In its military and related political aspects our effort in China requires more positive direction and closer cooperation with the Chinese if this area is to be an effective basis of operations against the Japanese.

#### *Message No. 2.*

There is a strong probability that east China will be severed from west China in the near future. It is the general opinion that such a development can only be prevented by unforeseeable chance. There are various estimates with regard to the rapidity with which the Japanese may be able to carry out their intentions. Although the time factor may be longer than most people seem to expect, I feel that we should be prepared to see all of east China in Japanese hands within three or four weeks.

The loss of east China will nullify our military effort in this area. It will also prove a violent political and economic shock to the Chungking regime.

China may be rendered almost valueless as an Allied military base unless determined steps are taken to halt the disintegrative process. Popular and military morale, both seriously impaired already, must somehow be strengthened. A new offensive effort must somehow be organized, primarily guerrilla in character probably.

It is necessary also to consider political factors.

Disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways which you will understand.

The foregoing picture has been drawn on the basis of the best available information to show you how serious is the situation. However, the situation is far from hopeless and may actually be turned to both military and political advantage if the right steps are taken promptly. The Generalissimo is alarmed, anxious for guidance, and, I believe, prepared to make drastic changes if wisely approached. Insecurity has undermined vested interests in the Government. It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least the semblance of a united front necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to ask you to appoint a personal representative to serve as liaison between you and him. Carton de Wiart occupies somewhat the same position between Churchill and Chiang. In my opinion a move of this kind is strongly indicated by the politico-military situation.

An American General officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears that operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain close contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does not enjoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp overall political considerations. I do not think any officer in China is qualified to undertake the assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he should not be removed from his present military position. The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions; (2) command all American forces in China; and (3) bring about full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he command American forces in China because without this his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with a right to deal directly with the White House on political questions or China may be separated from General Stilwell's present command.

Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation here to drift continuously from bad to worse. I believe a representative should be appointed and reach Chungking before east China is finally lost so that he can assume control of the situation before it degenerates too far.

While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his visit here he made himself *persona grata* to Chiang.



I realize that my opinions are based on a very short stay and that the number of people who could be consulted has necessarily been limited. In particular, I regret not having been able to see

General Stilwell and get his views. Nevertheless, I am convinced of the need for the decisive action summarized in the final paragraph of my previous message.

## Iranian Oil Problem Reviewed <sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press September 19]

*Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, special assistant to the President, today authorized the publication of his exchange of messages with Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeq of Iran. These documents are being released to the press at Tehran by the Iranian Government.*

### PRIME MINISTER MOSADEQ'S MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

SEPTEMBER 12, 1951

The Saheb Gharanieh Conference which came into existence as a result of Your Excellency's endeavours and good will and in which the Iranian Government and people had lodged their complete faith unfortunately did not produce the desirable results. Subsequent to this His Excellency Mr. Stokes <sup>2</sup> and Your Excellency left Iran on August 22 and 24 respectively, and the negotiations were declared to be suspended in spite of the fact that in my last meeting with Mr. Stokes I gave him in writing the viewpoints of the Imperial Iranian Government and His Excellency promised to give due consideration to the same and inform me about his views from London. While the Iranian Government expected that the negotiations would be started on the basis of the viewpoints submitted to him unfortunately we have been kept in suspense up to the present. It is even said that they are expecting new proposals from us in London. This state of suspense which has lasted has become intolerable.

Since Your Excellency representing His Ex-

cellency, the President of the United States of America, has arranged the negotiations between Iran on the one hand and the British Government representing the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on the other, and on your departure from Tehran and later in London and Washington has kindly proposed your voluntary cooperation, hence the Iranian Government ventures to offer the present proposals through Your Excellency with a request of their immediate transmission to the British Government as the representative of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company:

Firstly, as Your Excellency is well aware the main point of difference which had appeared during the last days of negotiations concerned itself with the management of the National Oil Company of Iran. Mr. Stokes suggested that either an operating agency or a British General Director should have charge of the management of the oil industry in the south of Iran. While the Iranian Government could not give its accord to such a proposal because according to the formula which had been submitted by Your Excellency to the British Government and both the Iranian and the British Governments had agreed with the same it was obvious that all the exploration, extraction and exploitation activities should be in the hands of the Iranian Government, and to accept any proposal contrary to the said formula would be looked upon as submission to a revival of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company under a new guise.

The Iranian Government does not deny the fact of its need in a foreign technical staff and also the fact that such technical men need to have sufficient autonomy and liberty of action which would be conducive to the best management of the industry. The former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was divided to various departments having at the head of each department foreign experts with necessary and proper liberty of action. The Iranian Government has in mind to keep the same organization insofar as it does not contradict the terms of the Nationalization Law and to employ the managers and the responsables of technical sections in the National Oil Company with the

<sup>1</sup> On May 18, the United States expressed deep concern over the dispute between the Iranian and British Governments over Iranian oil. In the course of correspondence with the Prime Minister of Iran, President Truman suggested in his message of July 8 that his special assistant, W. Averell Harriman, act as a mediator in the oil negotiations. Upon the acknowledgment of the President's suggestion by Prime Minister Mosadeq on July 11, Ambassador Harriman left Washington for Iran on July 13 to begin negotiations. For further information concerning the Iranian oil situation see the BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 851; June 4, 1951, p. 891; July 9, 1951, p. 72, 73; July 23, 1951, p. 129; September 3, 1951, p. 382.

<sup>2</sup> Richard Stokes is Lord Privy Seal and head of the British delegation at the Iranian oil discussions.

same amount of authority which they have enjoyed previously. Furthermore, in order to keep pace with the technical advance of the modern world in the line of oil technology the Imperial Iranian Government is prepared to take advantage of the expert knowledge of foreign technicians from neutral countries and to provide in the organization law of the National Company the existence of a mixed executive board composed of such experts and the Iranian specialists who would jointly manage the administrative and technical affairs of the National Oil Company of Iran.

Secondly, while it has been repeatedly stated that the Iranian Government has never intended and is not intending to confiscate the properties of the former company yet it proposes the following three methods for an equitable settlement of the just claims of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with due regard to the claims of the Imperial Iranian Government:

(A) The determination and the amount of compensation to be based on the quoted value of the shares of the former company at the prevailing quotations prior to the passage of the Oil Nationalization Law.

(B) The rules and regulations relative to nationalization in general which have been followed in democratic countries to be regarded as a basis for the determination and the amount of compensation.

(C) Or any other method which may be adopted by mutual consent of the two parties.

Thirdly, with reference to the sale of oil as we have been informed Britain has been using about 10 million tons of Iranian oil per year for its internal consumption, the Iranian Government declares its readiness to sell this amount of oil for a period agreed upon by mutual consent of both parties every year at the prevailing international prices on the basis of the f.o.b. value in Iranian port.

Fourthly, one of the proposals of His Excellency, Mr. Stokes, was the transport of Iranian oil by a company which he proposed. It must be said that we can agree to deliver the fixed amount of oil which is sold to Great Britain to any company or transport agency of their designation. The aforesaid points are to be regarded as a basis for starting new negotiations and the Iranian Government hopes that eventually an agreement may be reached.

The Iranian Government and people can no longer tolerate this state of suspension because on the one hand there are a great number of British experts in Abadan who are prevented by the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to be employed by the National Oil Company of Iran and the Iranian Government therefore with all its good intentions and expectations to arrive at a mutually satisfactory conclusion has so far abstained from employing experts from other countries. On the

other hand so long as the existing differences have not been removed and certain employees of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company cause new agitation everyday and create misunderstandings in the relations between the two governments of Great Britain and Iran, it is quite obvious that other countries will not be ready to send their experts to Iran and enter into transactions for the purchase of oil with us. It must be pointed out that as a result of this confused state of affairs and the derangements in the economic and financial affairs of the country in addition to the enormous maintenance costs of the oil industry imposed on our budget, we cannot endure such a situation for a long time and the Iranian Government because of its great responsibility deems it necessary to bring to a close this period of uncertainty. Hence if in the lapse of 15 days from the date at which this present proposal is submitted to the British Government no satisfactory conclusion is achieved, the Imperial Iranian Government regrets to state its compulsion to cancel the residence permits held by the British Staff and experts now residing in the southern oil fields.

#### AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S REPLY

SEPTEMBER 15, 1951

Your Excellency's message of September 12 has been communicated to me by the Iranian Ambassador. I share your regret that the discussions between the Iranian Government and the British delegation under Lord Privy Seal Stokes did not culminate in an agreement upon a settlement of the oil controversy. I know that the continued interruption to the production and shipment of Iranian oil imposes a very considerable hardship upon the economy of Iran as it does upon the economy of Great Britain. The United States and the entire free world looked anxiously upon these discussions in the hope that some solution could be found which would satisfy the legitimate interests of both parties.

I assure Your Excellency that I continue to stand ready to assist in any way that I can in finding a just solution. In my efforts thus far I have endeavored to be frank and objective in the advice that I have given to the Iranian Government, as well as to the British Government. It is in this objective and friendly spirit, and in an effort to be helpful to you in arriving at a settlement, that I should like to comment upon the substance of your communication.

With reference to the proposals in general, I should say at the outset that they appear to be the same as proposals made by the Iranian Government during the course of the negotiations in Tehran, which the British Mission did not accept since they did not conform to practical and commercial aspects of the international oil industry. In some respects the proposals in fact represent

a retrogression from the positions taken during the discussions.

Your Excellency has suggested that the various departments of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company be retained, insofar as this does not conflict with the terms of the Nationalization Law, and that the managers and other responsible personnel of the technical sections be employed in the National Oil Company of Iran with the same authority which they enjoyed previously. You have also stated that the Iranian Government is prepared to create a mixed executive board composed of Iranian and neutral foreign technicians who would jointly manage the administrative and technical affairs of the National Oil Company of Iran.

In discussing this possibility during the negotiations in Tehran, I endeavored to point out to the Iranian representatives the impracticability of attempting to operate a large and complex industry on the basis of a number of section heads reporting to a board of directors, with no single individual being given executive authority. I believe that no organization can operate effectively in this manner and I understood Mr. Stokes' position in Tehran to be that the British would not consider it workable. Moreover, I have pointed out that effective operations, particularly of a refinery of the size and complexity of that in Abadan, require the employment of an integrated organization rather than the employment of individual foreign specialists. Competent technicians would not themselves consent to employment except under conditions satisfactory to them. Such conditions would include assurance that the industry was under capable management and operated in a manner which would assure safety and efficiency.

Your Excellency has expressed concern that the arrangements for the operation of the oil industry must take into account the requirements of the Nationalization Law. I am convinced that arrangements are possible which would meet this objective and at the same time would assure that the oil industry is conducted on an efficient basis. During our visit in Tehran Mr. Levy and I discussed with Iranian officials arrangements under which a competent organization could be employed to operate under the control of the National Oil Company of Iran. Such arrangements are a common business practice throughout the world.

Your Excellency has reiterated that the Iranian Government has not intended and does not intend to confiscate the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and has suggested methods for the determination of the amount of compensation.

While I have no comments upon your suggestions for determining the value of the assets, it is obvious that payment of compensation must depend upon and will be affected by arrangements for the efficient operation of the oil industry to assure that the products continue to be made available for sale to world markets. As I have pointed

out to Your Excellency, in the view of the United States Government the seizure by any government of foreign-owned assets without either prompt, adequate and effective compensation or alternative arrangements satisfactory to the former owners is, regardless of the intent, confiscation rather than nationalization. There must be more than a willingness to pay; there must be the ability to do so in an effective form. I believe, however, that if arrangements for the sale of oil are made with the British interests the compensation problem could be worked out satisfactorily and that the net oil income accruing to Iran could be as large as that of any other oil-producing country under comparable circumstances.

Your Excellency has stated that the Iranian Government is prepared to sell to the British ten million tons of oil per year, this quantity representing an estimate of Iranian oil previously used in Great Britain. It is specified that sales would be at prevailing international prices on the basis of the f.o.b. value at Iranian ports. It is also stated that this oil would be delivered to any company or transport agency designated by the British.

As I pointed out to Your Excellency in Tehran, in order to be assured of continuous sales of substantial quantities of its oil in world markets Iran must make arrangements with customers that can make available large transportation and distribution facilities for marketing it on a world-wide basis. Potential customers would not make such arrangements unless they could obtain Iranian oil on a basis as favorable as that on which they could buy or develop oil in other producing countries. This, of course, is a practical business consideration. It is also true that only those who have developed markets for Iranian oil are in a position to commit themselves for its purchase in the large quantities produced.

The production of Iranian oil before the present controversy arose amounted to some 30 million tons per year. The major portion of this production was handled by British concerns and affiliates which have developed markets for it throughout the world. Only they have the great transportation facilities needed to carry the oil from Iran to its markets, where only they have the necessary distribution facilities for it. Arrangements, including financial terms, for the sale of only that portion of the oil which previously went to Great Britain would leave the problem of shipping to and distribution in other parts of the world unsolved, and would force the British interests to develop other sources of supply.

During the negotiations in Tehran the Iranian Government indicated its willingness to consider a long-term contract for the sale of Iranian oil to an organization acting on behalf of former purchasers of the products. Under this suggestion, that portion of the industry's output which was not covered by this contract could be sold directly



by the National Oil Company of Iran to its own customers. Your Excellency's present suggestion would indicate that there has been a change in this position.

Your Excellency, in pointing out that the suspension of negotiations with the British and the shutdown of the Iranian oil industry have created a serious situation in Iran, has stated that if a satisfactory conclusion is not achieved within 15 days from the date on which your proposal is submitted to the British Government the Iranian Government intends to cancel the residence permits held by the British staff and experts now residing in the southern oilfields.

As I have pointed out to Your Excellency, the proposals which you have set forth in your communication do not represent an advance from the positions taken in the discussions in Tehran and in some respects appear to be the opposite. I believe that the problem with which Iran and Great Britain are confronted can be settled only by negotiations based upon recognition of the practical business and technical aspects of the oil industry and based upon mutual good will between the parties. Such a settlement, which would attain Iranian aspirations for control of the oil industry within Iran, is, I am convinced, possible and feasible in accordance with the discussions we have had in Tehran and the comments I have made. However, I consider that my passing your communication to the British Government would militate against a settlement, particularly in view of the position taken regarding the expulsion of the British employees in southern Iran, a position which I believe will only further aggravate an already serious situation.

As a sincere friend of Iran, I earnestly hope that Your Excellency will reconsider the points set forth in your communication and that a basis can be developed under which negotiations can soon be resumed. I want to tell Your Excellency how much I appreciate your communicating with me on this matter. As stated earlier, I am anxious to be as helpful as circumstances permit, but for the reasons I have set forth I regret that it is not possible for me to meet your request in this particular instance.

## Trade Concessions on Bulgarian Imports Suspended

[Released to the press September 17]

The President today notified the Department of the Treasury that after the close of business on October 17, 1951, U.S. concessions, made in trade agreements, will be suspended with regard to imports from Bulgaria. The action was taken in accordance with section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 which provides, in

part, that "As soon as practicable, the President shall take such action as is necessary to suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of any reduction in any rate of duty, or binding of any existing customs or excise treatment, or other concession contained in any trade agreement . . . to imports from any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement."

A provisional commercial agreement concluded between the United States and the Bulgarian Government on August 18, 1932, provided for most-favored-nation tariff treatment in their trade. This agreement was subject to termination under its own terms, on 3-months' notice by either party. Notice by the United States of its intention to terminate the agreement was transmitted to the Bulgarian Government, through the Swiss Government, on July 12, 1951. The notice was transmitted through the Swiss Government by reason of the fact that the United States and Bulgaria had suspended diplomatic relations in February 1950. The provisional agreement will terminate on October 12. Announcement of the giving of this notice was made on July 6.<sup>1</sup>

On August 1 the President signed a proclamation ordering the suspension of trade-agreement concessions from Communist-dominated countries. Because, however, the United States on that date had international commitments with several such countries, which were not consistent with the withdrawal of concessions from them, the proclamation stated that the Treasury would be notified, from time to time, of the countries from whose goods the concessions should be suspended. On the same date the President notified the Treasury of the suspension, as of August 31, of trade-agreement concessions on imports from various specified countries.<sup>2</sup>

Total U.S. imports from Bulgaria in 1949 were valued at \$1,937,000, of which \$1,612,000 worth were dutiable. By far the largest item on the list was cigarette leaf tobacco, other than Latakia leaf type, unstemmed. Imports of this product in 1949 were valued at \$1,556,000 and were subject to a concession contained in the U.S. agreement of 1939 with Turkey. Imports of rose oil were valued at \$201,000 in 1949. Rose oil, however, is free of duty under the Tariff Act of 1930 and is not subject to any trade-agreement concession. Imports from Bulgaria in 1949 of goat and kid skins, dry and dry-salted, bound free in a trade-agreement concession, were valued at \$98,000. Thus concession items accounted for 96.5 percent of total dutiable, and 30.2 percent of total duty-free, imports from Bulgaria in 1949.

Total U.S. exports to Bulgaria in 1949 were valued at about \$1,400,000; in 1950 the figure declined to about \$800,000.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 291.

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## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings <sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During September 1951

Festival of Britain . . . . .	England	May 3-Sept. 30
9th International Exhibition of Decorative and Industrial Arts and Modern Architecture	Milan	May 5-Sept. 30
UN (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council: 13th Session . . . . .	Geneva	July 30-Sept. 21
Economic Commission for Europe:		
2d European Regional Conference of Statisticians . . . . .	Geneva	Sept. 17-22
XII International Festival of Cinematographic Art . . . . .	Venice	Aug. 8-Sept. 10
Edinburgh Film Festival . . . . .	Edinburgh	Aug. 19-Sept. 9
International Union of Geodesy & Geophysics: 9th General Assembly	Brussels	Aug. 21-Sept. 1
Izmir International Fair . . . . .	Izmir	Aug. 20-Sept. 20
40th General Assembly, Interparliamentary Union . . . . .	Istanbul	Aug. 31-Sept. 6
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Training Center on Nematology . . . . .	Hardenden, (England)	Sept. 3-14
Land Utilization in Tropical Areas of Asia and the Far East, Regional Meeting on.	Nuwara Eliya, (Ceylon)	Sept. 17-29
Plant Quarantine Conference . . . . .	Rome	Sept. 25-27
Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History	Mexico City	Sept. 3-6
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Search and Rescue Division: Third Session . . . . .	Montreal	Sept. 4-22
Conference for Conclusion and Signature of Treaty of Peace with Japan	San Francisco	Sept. 4-8
Levant Fair, 40th . . . . .	Bari (Italy)	Sept. 8-25
Venezuelan National Petroleum Convention . . . . .	Caracas	Sept. 8-18
6th Annual Meeting of Boards of Governors of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund	Washington	Sept. 10-14
Tripartite Meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States	Washington	Sept. 10-14
First Meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council . . . . .	Mexico City	Sept. 10-25
18th International Conference on Documentation . . . . .	Rome	Sept. 15-22
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
7th Session of the Council . . . . .	Ottawa	Sept. 15-20
3d International Congress of Social Defense . . . . .	San Marino	Sept. 16-22
World Tobacco Congress . . . . .	Amsterdam	Sept. 17-24
WHO (World Health Organization):		
2d Session of the Regional Committee for the Western Pacific Region	Manila	Sept. 18-21
1st Meeting of the Regional Committee for Africa . . . . .	Geneva	Sept. 22-30
4th Session of the Regional Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean Area	Cyprus	Sept. 24-29
International Tin Study Group: 6th Meeting . . . . .	Rome	Sept. 24-29
14th Meeting of Executive Committee of the Pan American Sanitary Organization	Washington	Sept. 20-22
International Convention on Table Grapes . . . . .	Hoeilaart (Belgium)	Sept. 28-29

#### In Session as of September 30, 1951

UN (United Nations): General Assembly: 5th Session, Committee #1	New York	Sept. 19, 1950-
International Materials Conference . . . . .	Washington	Feb. 26-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Sept. 24, 1951.

**Calendar of Meetings—Continued**  
**In Session as of September 30, 1951—Continued**

ITU (International Telecommunication Union): Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference . . . . .	Geneva	Aug. 16-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): Legal Committee: 8th Session . . . . .	Madrid	Sept. 11-
Council: 14th Session . . . . .	Montreal	Sept. 28-
International Fair of Thessaloniki . . . . .	Salonika	Sept. 16-
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade): 6th Session of the Contracting Parties . . . . .	Geneva	Sept. 17-
Pan American Sanitary Organization: 14th Meeting of Executive Committee . . . . .	Washington	Sept. 20-
5th Session of the Directing Council . . . . .	Washington	Sept. 24-
WHO (World Health Organization): 3d Meeting of Regional Com- mittee . . . . .	Washington	Sept. 24-
International Lumber Exposition . . . . .	Lyon	Sept. 23-
9th International Road Congress and International Exhibition of Roadmaking Materials . . . . .	Lisbon	Sept. 22-

**Scheduled October 1-December 31**

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea . . . . .	Amsterdam	Oct. 1-
ILO (International Labor Organization): 2d Conference on Migration . . . . .	Naples	Oct. 2-
Asian Advisory Committee: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva	Nov. 10-
Governing Body: 117th Session . . . . .	Geneva	Nov. 14-
Asian Manpower Conference . . . . .	Bangkok	Dec. 12-
Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session . . . . .	Genoa	Dec. 4-
WMO (World Meteorological Organization): Executive Committee, 2d Session . . . . .	Geneva	Oct. 3-
Pan American Sanitary Organization: 15th Meeting of the Executive Committee . . . . .	Washington	Oct. 3-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization): Regional Conference of Professional Librarians on the Develop- ment of Public Libraries in Latin America . . . . .	São Paulo	Oct. 3-
Executive Board: 27th Session . . . . .	Paris	Oct. 23-
2d Regional Conference of Representatives of National Commis- sions . . . . .	Bangkok	Dec. 10-
International Symposium on Arid Zone Hydrology . . . . .	Undetermined	Dec. 18-
International Conference on Land Tenure, Land Use and Related Problems . . . . .	Madison (Wis.)	Oct. 7-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): Special Meeting, Coordination of Air Traffic in Western Europe . . . . .	Paris	Oct. 8-
Aeronautical Maps and Charts Division: 5th Session . . . . .	Montreal	Oct. 9-
South American-South Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting: 2d Session . . . . .	Buenos Aires	Oct. 30-
Facilitation Division: 3d Session . . . . .	Buenos Aires	Nov. 21
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization): European Forestry and Forest Products Commission . . . . .	Rome	Oct. 8-
Technical Working Party for Continuation of Studies of Chestnut Trees . . . . .	Rome, Naples, Florence, Italy; and Lugano, Switz.	Oct. 12-
13th Session of the Council . . . . .	Rome	Nov. 12-
Annual Conference: 6th Session . . . . .	Rome	Nov. 19-
14th Session of the Council . . . . .	Rome	Dec. 10-
Plant Nutrient Problems, Latin American Mtg. on . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro	Nov.
5th Pan American Highway Congress . . . . .	Lima	Oct. 8-
International Congress on Early History and Future of Paris . . . . .	Paris	Oct. 8-
1st Latin Union Congress . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro	Oct. 12-
Scientific Unions, International Council of: Meeting of Executive Committee . . . . .	Washington	Oct. 14-
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe . . . . .	Strasbourg	Oct. 15-
IRO (International Refugee Organization): Executive Committee: 10th Session . . . . .	Geneva	Oct. 18-
General Council: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva	Oct. 22-
ITU International Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIF): 16th Plenary Assembly . . . . .	Florence	Oct. 22-
South Pacific Commission: 8th Session . . . . .	Nouméa	Oct. 27-
Caribbean Commission: 13th Meeting . . . . .	St. Croix	Oct. 29-
Conference on Administrative and Scientific Problems Relating to Food Aspects of Civilian Defense . . . . .	London	Nov. 1-
Inter-American Bar Association: 7th Conference . . . . .	Montevideo	Nov. 22-



## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled October 1–December 31—Continued

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Council: 8th Session.	Europe	Nov.
International Statistical Institute: 27th Session . . . . .	{New Delhi Calcutta	Dec. 5– Dec. 16–
Special Meeting of Board of American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood.	Montevideo	Dec.
2d Pan American Pharmaceutical Congress . . . . .	Lima	Dec.
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: 4th Session	New York	Oct. 1–
Regional Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations on United Nations Information	Paris	Oct. 29–
Subcommission on Statistical Sampling: 5th Session . . . . .	New Delhi	Dec. 19–
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Conference on Trade Promotion . . . . .	Singapore	Oct. 9–
Railway Subcommittee . . . . .	Bangkok	Oct. 22–
Special Committee on Information Transmitted Under Article 73 (e) of the Charter	Geneva	Oct. 2–
Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: 36th Session . . . . .	Geneva	Oct. 22–
Permanent Central Opium Board and Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: 6th Joint Session	Geneva	Oct. 29–
Permanent Central Opium Board: 58th Session . . . . .	Geneva	Nov. 1–
General Assembly: 6th Session . . . . .	Paris	Nov. 6–

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Contracting Parties (GATT): 6th Session

The Department of State announced on September 17 that the U.S. delegation to the sixth session of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which will convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on that date, is as follows:

#### Chairman

The Honorable Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

#### Vice Chairman

John M. Leddy, Acting Director, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State

#### Members

George Bronz, Special Assistant to the General Counsel, Department of the Treasury  
Jack C. Corbett, Deputy Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State  
Joseph Greenwald, Commercial Policy Staff, Department of State  
John W. Hight, Economic Specialist, Office of Special Representative in Europe, Economic Cooperation Administration, Paris  
Walter Hollis, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State  
Walter M. Kotschnig, Director, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State  
J. Robert Schaezel, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State  
Robert B. Schwenger, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture  
Robert Simpson, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

#### Technical Secretary

Helen L. Brewster, Policy Reporting Staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State

#### Secretary of the Delegation

Robert E. Read, Office of the Conference Attaché, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

Under the provisions of the General Agreement, the representatives of the contracting parties meet from time to time for the purpose of facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of the agreement. A detailed agenda for the sixth session will be adopted at the opening of the meeting. Among the items which will be considered are the strengthening of the administration of the General Agreement, a review of restrictions applied for balance-of-payment reasons, and other problems relating to the application of the agreement. As was announced on July 31, the contracting parties will also consider at the sixth session the proposal of the United States that all obligations between it and Czechoslovakia by virtue of the provisions of the agreement be suspended or terminated. The first session of the contracting parties was held at Habana, February 28–March 24, 1948; the second session at Geneva, August 16–September 14, 1948; the third session at Annecy, France, April 8–August 13, 1949; the fourth session at Geneva, February 23–April 4, 1950; and the fifth session at Torquay, England, November 2–December 16, 1950.

**Committee for Western Pacific  
Region (WHO): 2d Session**

The Department of State announced on September 17 that the second session of the Regional Committee for the Western Pacific Region of the World Health Organization (WHO) will be held at Manila, the Philippines, September 18-21. Dr. Howard Kline, chief, Education and Training Branch, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, will attend the meeting as official U.S. observer.

This session will consider the budget and organization for the Western Pacific Region and examine reports on present and future health and sanitation programs and their implementation in the countries which have signified their desire to be members of that regional organization.

The first session of this Regional Committee was convened at Geneva, Switzerland, on May 18, 1951.

**U.N. Special Committee on Information**

On September 17 the Department of State announced that Benjamin Gerig, Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, will attend the meeting of the U.N. Special Committee on Information transmitted under article 73 (e) of the U.N. Charter, scheduled to convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on October 2, in his capacity as U.S. representative on the committee. He will be assisted by the following other members of the U.S. delegation:

*Special Advisers on Economic Conditions and Development*

William J. Stibravy, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State  
Roberto deJesus, Director of Budget, Puerto Rican Government

*Advisers*

Capt. Thomas F. Darden, U.S. Navy Department  
James P. Davis, Director, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior  
Vernon McKay, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

This committee, which was reconstituted by the General Assembly in 1949, for a 3-year period, carries out a preliminary review of documents prepared by the U.N. Secretariat on the basis of the information transmitted by administering members on economic, social, and educational conditions in their non-self-governing territories and makes certain recommendations thereon to the General Assembly. The United States is a member of the committee by virtue of the fact that it is one of the members of the United Nations transmitting information on such territories.

The agenda for this meeting of the Special Committee includes consideration of education, economic conditions, and development in non-self-governing territories; information on technical assistance accorded to non-self-governing terri-

tries by the United Nations and the specialized agencies; the Secretary-General's summaries and analyses of information transmitted during 1951; and examination of factors to be taken into account in deciding whether any territory is or is not a territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.

The last meeting of the Special Committee convened at Lake Success, N.Y., on August 18, 1950.

**Pan American Sanitary and  
Health Organizations**

The Department of State announced on September 17 that the fifth session of the Directing Council of the Pan American Sanitary Organization (Paso) and 3d meeting of the Regional Committee of the World Health Organization for the Americas will be held at Washington, D.C., September 24-October 2, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

*U. S. Representative*

Leonard A. Scheele, M.D., Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency

*Alternate U. S. Representatives*

H. van Zile Hyde, M.D., Director, Division of Health and Sanitation, Institute of Inter-American Affairs  
Howard B. Calderwood, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

*Advisers*

William G. Bowdler, Division of International Administration, Department of State  
Frederick J. Brady, M.D., Assistant Chief, International Organization Branch, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency  
Marcia M. Fleming, Office of Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Department of State  
Simon N. Wilson, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

The fourteenth and fifteenth meetings of the Executive Committee of the Paso will also be held at Washington, D.C., September 20-22, and October 3-4, 1951, respectively. The U.S. delegation to these meetings is as follows:

*U.S. Representative*

H. van Zile Hyde, M.D.

*Alternate U.S. Representatives*

Frederick J. Brady, M.D.  
Howard B. Calderwood.

*Adviser*

Simon N. Wilson.

Both U.S. representatives and their alternates were previously appointed by the President.

The Pan American Sanitary Organization, organized in 1902 as the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, has as its purpose the coordination of the public health efforts of the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Technical advisory services are

provided, and programs, including the control of tuberculosis, venereal disease, yellow fever, malaria, and other insect-borne diseases, are being carried on to assist member governments in raising the level of health and thereby contributing to the improvement of the economic and social well-being of the people of the Americas.

The Directing Council, created in 1947, serves as the executive body of the Paso between quadrennial sessions of the Pan American Sanitary Conference, which is the Organization's governing body. It also serves as the Regional Committee of the World Health Organization for the Americas. The last annual meeting of the Directing Council was held at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, in September 1950.

The forthcoming session of the Directing Council and Regional Committee is the first held at Washington, which was selected by the thirteenth Pan American Sanitary Conference as the permanent headquarters of the Pan American Sanitary Organization.

The Executive Committee, composed of seven governments, elected by the Directing Council, performs interim executive and advisory functions between meetings of the council and prepares agenda for council meetings. The last meeting of the Executive Committee was held at Washington, D.C., April 23-May 1, 1951.

Among the most important agenda items to be considered at the Washington meetings are the program and budget of the Paso for 1952 and 1953; agenda items for the fourteenth Pan American Sanitary Conference to be held in 1954; implementation of the program for the control of insect-borne diseases, including organization of sanitary services, and contemplated revisions of the constitution of the Pan American Sanitary Organization.

#### **Latin American Fisheries (FAO)**

On September 17 the Department of State announced that the Latin American Fisheries meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations will convene at Lima, Peru, September 17-22. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

##### *Chairman*

William C. Herrington, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, Department of State

##### *Advisers*

Milton Lindner, Fish and Wildlife Service, Fishery Mission to Mexico, México, D. F., Mex.  
Harold Cary, Manager, American Tuna Boat Association, San Diego, Calif.

The meeting at Lima has been called to consider the desirability of establishing a Fisheries Council for the Latin American area, and, if favorably received, to adopt a form of agreement for sub-

mission to the sixth session of the FAO conference to be convened at Rome in November 1951. If approved by the conference, it will be forwarded to interested member governments for action.

The particular object of the Council is stated to be the promotion and improvement of fisheries by increasing knowledge of aquatic resources in order to make possible maximum use in perpetuity and to use the Council's good offices to promote and secure action in this field. This is in line with the general objectives of the FAO of raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of peoples by contributing to improvements in efficiency of production and distribution of all food and agricultural products.

The principal agenda items include consideration of the functions of the Council, i.e., its objects, its fields of interest, and the means of achieving its objectives, and a draft instrument for establishment of the Council.

#### **First International Congress on Allergy**

The Department of State announced on September 17 that the First International Congress on Allergy will convene at Zürich, Switzerland, September 23-29. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

##### *Chairman*

Arthur Stull, M. D., Pathology and Allied Sciences Division, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army

##### *Delegates*

Arthur J. Berger, Lt. Col., M.C., U.S.A., Chief, Clinical Pathology, Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D.C.

Milton G. Bohrod, M.D., Pathologist and Director of Laboratories, Rochester General Hospital, Rochester, N.Y.

Joseph Harkavy, M.D., Professor of Medicine, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

Howard Osgood, M.D., Chief, Allergy Clinics, Buffalo, N.Y.

Arnold A. Rich, M.D., Baxley Professor of Pathology, Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, Md.

Louis Schwartz, M.D., Acting Assistant Surgeon, Columbia Medical Surgeon, Columbia Medical Annex, Washington, D.C.

James J. Smith, M.D., Chief, Education Division, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Veterans Administration

An untold number of people throughout the world are incapacitated for varying periods of time from allergies. This meeting will afford the first opportunity for international discussion of this important field in medicine and health.

The agenda for the First International Congress on Allergy includes an examination of the nature, causes, and effects of allergies, as well as a determination of means of treatment through laboratory, clinical, and other practical methods.



## Documents Relating to Armistice Negotiations in Korea

### Message from North Korean and Communist Commanders to U.N. Commander

[SEPTEMBER 19, 1951]

*Following is the text of a message broadcast by the Peiping radio on September 20:*

Your reply dated Sept. 17<sup>1</sup> has been received.

Both your letter and the letter from Vice Admiral Joy, chief delegate of your side, to General Nam Il, chief delegate of our side, dated Sept. 11,<sup>2</sup> have admitted the fact that United Nations forces aircraft strafed the Kaesong neutral zone on Sept. 10.

However, your side still denies the various incidents which took place before Sept. 10 when the United Nations forces violated the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement from the air and on the ground, which made it impossible to proceed with the Kaesong negotiations.

This kind of denial though can by no means alter or do away with all the witnesses and the material evidence which we possess concerning these incidents. And, therefore, the incidents which our side has drawn attention to and protested about must be dealt with in a responsible way.

In view of the fact that your side has expressed regret concerning the latest incident in which the United Nations forces violated the Kaesong neutral zone and willingness to take a responsible attitude regarding violations of the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement and in order not to let the previously mentioned unsettled incidents continue to obstruct the progress of the negotiations of both sides, we, therefore, propose that the delegates of both sides should immediately resume the armistice negotiations at Kaesong without any need for further discussion of the conditions for the resumption of the armistice negotiations.

As to dealing with the previously mentioned unsettled incidents, and stipulating and guaranteeing strict agreement on the Kaesong zone neutrality, we propose that at the first meeting after the resumption of the Kaesong armistice negotiations appropriate machinery be set up by arrangement of both sides to carry out these tasks.

Of course, all agreement, reached through such appropriate machinery will be valid only after ratification by the delegates of both sides.

If you agree we hope that you will immediately order the liaison officers of your side to consult with our liaison officers concerning the date and time for resuming the negotiations at Kaesong.

KIM IL SONG,  
Supreme Commander Korean Peoples Army.  
PENG TEH-HUAL,  
Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers.

Sept. 19, 1951.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 513.

<sup>2</sup> Not here printed.

### Announcement by the U.N. Command

[SEPTEMBER 19, 1951]

*Following is the text of the United Nations Command announcement of September 19, after investigation of the Communist charge of violating the neutrality zone.*

Four unarmed South Korean medical corps soldiers wandered into the Communist Panmunjom checkpoint on the fringe of the Kaesong neutral zone yesterday and were held for twenty hours until the completion of a United Nations Command (U.N.C.) investigation of the incident this morning. The soldiers and the truck in which they were riding have been released to U.N.C. control.

The four soldiers, part of an anti-epidemic unit and armed with nothing more dangerous than D.D.T., lost their way yesterday afternoon and crossed the Panmunjom bridge into the neutral zone. In charge of the group was First Sergt. Na Kwang Sin. The unit is attached to the First R.O.K. (Republic of Korea) Division.

Notification that an incident had occurred involving ground forces of the U.N.C. reached the U.N.C. advance headquarters last night and liaison officers went to Panmunjom this morning to investigate. The group with Lieut. Col. Norman B. Edwards of Diamond, W. Va., in charge, and with Col. Minir K. Wilson of Cleveland, Ohio, as an observer, arrived at Panmunjom at 9 a. m. Colonel Wilson is the inspector general of I (First) Corps and an investigating officer of allegations which concern western front ground troops.

During the investigation, the U.N.C. investigators interrogated the R.O.K. soldiers, following which they and the 1½-ton truck which had been captured with them were released.

Sergeant Na asserted that the unit, sent out to spray R.O.K. billets, had been unable to locate the units and had inadvertently entered the neutral zone.

Advised of his error by the Communists at the checkpoint, Sergeant Na offered to turn back. The checkpoint personnel, however, notified the Communists' liaison group in Kaesong and the sergeant and his men were detained.

The Medical Corps soldiers were not mistreated during their overnight stay in Kaesong nor were their items of equipment confiscated or damaged.

The investigation took place without incident and in an atmosphere almost completely devoid of tension. The approach to Kaesong showed noticeable changes. Nearly all of the Communist soldiers along the road stood rigidly at attention as the U.N.C. party passed and one soldier held a stiff salute as the convoy entered and left the city. Many of the civilians in Kaesong smiled as the U.N. personnel passed by, in marked contrast to the inscrutable countenances they have shown on other occasions.

The last contact Sergeant Na and his men had with U.N. forces before they wandered into the checkpoint was at a sentry post a few miles to the south. There, according to the sergeant, a sentry said he could go "some farther" along the road.

When Na halted the Japanese-made truck at the check-

point he was subsequently told that in order to settle the matter quickly he must take the vehicle and the personnel to Kaesong. In the concluding minutes of the investigation, Colonel Edwards told Colonel Chang, Communist liaison officer: "It is obvious to us that the men were lost, that they wanted to turn back and that there was no intention of violating the neutral zone."

Edwards emphasized that the men were unarmed and on a purely medical mission and then requested that the men and their equipment be turned over to him "for return to their organization and such disciplinary action as we may take."

Colonel Chang replied that "according to our original agreement" no one except the delegation party was to enter the neutral zone and "consequently we think (this entry) was a violation of the agreement."

The Communist liaison officer further pointed out "there must have been guards on your side . . . it was broad daylight . . . there was clear visibility on the highway."

"By the order of our senior delegate I call your serious attention to this case," Colonel Chang said.

"I hand over these men to you now," he added.

Colonel Chang declared: "We desire that you will observe the neutrality agreement faithfully and that you will not permit such things [to occur]."

Colonel Edwards said that the men wanted to turn back at Panmunjom, were detained there, and so did not enter the neutral zone voluntarily.

"I'll report the matter to Admiral Joy who is as anxious as you are that no intentional violations of the neutral zone occur," Colonel Edwards said.

Following this exchange a receipt was prepared acknowledging the return of the soldiers and their equipment to the control of the U. N. C.

The only other matter discussed during the course of the investigation was a proposal for changing the radio frequency in use between the delegations. At Colonel Edwards' suggestion, signal officers of both sides will meet at 2 p. m. September 19 in Kaesong to discuss the change.

#### **Message From U.N. Commander to Communist Commanders**

[SEPTEMBER 23, 1951]

*The following message was broadcast to Generals Kim Il Song and Peng Teh-huai and was handed to Communist liaison officers at P'anmunjom at 10 a.m. (Korean Time) September 23:*

Your message of 19 September received 20 September 1951 and has been noted.

Your suggestion therein that there are instances of alleged violations of the Kaesong neutral zone which remain unsettled is rejected.

Each of these several cases wherein you reported an alleged violation was fully investigated. Where United Nations Command forces were responsible, that fact was reported. Where United Nations Command forces were not involved you were so advised and the cases were closed. I have so instructed my representatives.

I likewise reject the charge repeated in your letter that alleged violations of the neutral zone by United Nations Command forces made it impossible to continue negotiations. The responsibility unnecessary ----- (words missing) ----- incident to the resumption of negotiations, in spite of the fact that the armistice discussions have been interrupted for prolonged periods because of

incidents or alleged incidents. I have therefore given instructions to my liaison officers to insure that this vital subject receives careful attention in any future discussion with your liaison officers in order to minimize the likelihood of further interruption.

Since you are now ready to terminate the suspension of armistice talks which you declared on 23 August, my liaison officers will be at the bridge at P'anmunjom at 1000 hours 24 September to meet your liaison officers and to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for a resumption of the armistice talks.

#### **Message from Communist Commanders to U. N. Commander**

[SEPTEMBER 24, 1951]

Your reply dated Sept. 23 has been received. Although your message still refuses to acknowledge the various air and ground violations of the Kaesong neutrality agreement which were committed by the United Nations forces before Sept. 10 and which made it impossible for the Kaesong negotiations to proceed, pretending that all the incidents had been fully investigated by your side, yet from our side there was every reason and right to go on demanding that your side deal responsibly with these incidents because we possess adequate evidence concerning them and your side has time and again refused to make the investigations.

We have already instructed our delegates to put forward our demands for the appropriate machinery which should be set up by mutual agreement after the resumption of the Kaesong talks in order to deal with unsettled incidents.

It is generally known that what directly made it impossible for the Kaesong negotiations to continue was the provocative incidents of Aug. 22<sup>1</sup> and the series of similar incidents that followed, all of which were created by your side. Naturally therefore, your side has to bear the responsibility for it. Only since your side expressed regret for the Sept. 10 incident, that is the latest Kaesong neutrality violation by the United Nations forces, and willingness to deal responsibly with the Kaesong neutrality agreement violations, we considered that the armistice negotiations should be resumed at Kaesong immediately.

And these unsettled incidents should not be allowed to go on impeding the progress of the negotiations between both sides.

Our side has always requested that a strict agreement on the neutrality of the Kaesong area be worked out to avoid future violations and to reduce or even eliminate any possibility of the negotiations being suspended in the future. But the working out of such specific and strict stipulations as will be agreeable to both sides at the same time must be done not by the liaison officers, who have never had the power to do this, but by the delegates of both sides in discussions.

In order that the armistice negotiations may not be affected we proposed that appropriate machinery to deal with such matters be set up by discussions of both sides at the first meeting at the resumed Kaesong armistice negotiations. We hold that this is the most reasonable method.

Therefore, we have ordered the liaison officer of our side to meet the liaison officer of your side at 10 a. m. on September 24 to discuss the date and time for resuming the negotiations in Kaesong.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept 3, 1951, p. 389.

## New Volume on German Foreign Policy Released

On September 8 the Department of State released *The Aftermath of Munich, October 1938-March 1939*, volume IV, series D, of *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, which covers the closing phase of an independent Czechoslovakia, from the signature of the Munich agreement in September 1938 until the occupation of Prague in March 1939. The documents published in this volume continue the story of Germany's relations with the Great Powers and with Czechoslovakia which was described in volumes I and II of this series (volume III dealt with the Spanish Civil War).

The documents contained in this volume were selected from the official German papers captured by American and British forces in April-May 1945.

The volume is divided into eight chapters, the first dealing with the main subject, Czechoslovakia, the others with the relations between Germany and the principal powers.

German policy towards Czechoslovakia appears to go through three phases. At first, the Germans were prepared to act as though Czechoslovakia had retained its independence (see Documents 16, 44, 54). German requirements were discussed with the other Great Powers at the sessions of the International Commission which had been established to carry out the Munich agreement (Documents 2, 10, 11, 20, 24, 33, 41). An effort was made to settle the conflicting claims of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia to territory on the former borders of the Czechoslovak Republic (Documents 37, 62, 72, 73, 74, 87). It is clear from a brief supplied by the Foreign Ministry for Hitler on October 7 on the subject of Slovakia and Ruthenia (Document 45), that it did not desire to see Slovakia absorbed by Hungary, and still less by Poland. Hitler accepted the Foreign Ministry view (Document 46). Eventually, on November 2, the Axis Powers attempted a formal mediation between the Hungarians and Slovaks by the Vienna Award (Documents 98 and 99).

Alongside this policy to maintain the Czechoslovak Republic in existence, military plans were being made for its eventual liquidation. These were laid down in a secret directive to the Armed Forces on October 21, 1938 (Document 81) which

was elaborated by a further instruction of December 17, 1938 (Document 152).

During the late fall and winter there was no need for these plans to go into operation. The policy pursued by the Czech Government is shown by a despatch dated October 23, 1938, by the German representative in Prague (Document 85) to the effect that the Czechoslovak leaders were convinced of the necessity to cooperate with Germany as closely as possible.

The Czech Government was prepared to go further. On January 21, 1939, the Foreign Minister, M. Chvalkovsky, visited Berlin ready to sign a treaty of friendship which would have placed his country under effective German political and economic control (Documents 150, 158, 159).

In the first days of March 1939 there is a noticeable sharpening of tone towards the Czechs (Documents 177, 178, 185). On March 10 negotiations between the Czechs and Slovaks broke down, the Slovaks having demanded the right to declare their independence of Prague (Document 186). The German Foreign Ministry supported the Slovaks (Documents 191 and 193). On March 13 Mgr. Tiso, the Slovak leader, was summoned to Berlin and told by Hitler to choose between independence and annexation by Hungary (Document 202). On the evening of March 13 President Hácha asked for an interview with Hitler (Documents 207, 216). He came, and the final curtain was rung down on the Czechoslovak Republic by the abrupt ultimatum to Hácha and Chvalkovsky in Berlin (Documents 228, 229).

Germany's relations with the major powers—treated in the remaining chapters—are naturally overshadowed by Munich. From nearly all capitals came the interpretations of the crisis. The longest of these is also the most illuminating: Theodor Kordt's report from London (Document 248). The rest of this chapter shows the repeated efforts of the British Government to settle the difficulties outstanding between British and German commercial interests, as well as the attempt to reconcile naval construction plans (Documents 276, 278, 279, 288, 294-8, 328, 329), and it ends abruptly with a note of Sir Neville Henderson, the Ambassador in Berlin (Document 330) occasioned by Hitler's seizure of Czechoslovakia.

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After lengthy negotiations the Franco-German declaration of December 6, 1938, was signed in Paris as a belated counterpart to the Anglo-German declaration brought back from Munich by Neville Chamberlain, Ribbentrop having gone there for this purpose (see chapter III). At this time he threatened that Germany would sooner or later have to shake off the encircling treaties of France with the East by negotiation or "by some other means" (Document 370).

German-Italian relations continued, on the whole, to be good (chapter IV). After an initial silence Mussolini agreed in principle to the expansion of the anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance. While the parallel negotiations with Japan dragged on he was constantly pressing, in the face of German evasion, for the commencement of staff talks. The perennial conflicts over the South Tyrol question continued and a bewildered Propaganda Ministry even inquired in what way current publications were to be doctored to meet the situation (Document 439). The problem of Italian payments in foreign currency was the main issue of the routine economic negotiations (Documents 399, 414-20, 423-33, 445-48) which were concluded by the agreements of February 13, 1939, and the signing of the third of the series of secret protocols dealing with the planning of mutual economic aid—particularly for times of emergency (Document 451).

The chapter on relations with the Soviet Union (VI) is short. Politically there was little activity and the German diplomats in Moscow confined themselves to reporting the official interpretation of the Munich crisis (Documents 476, 477, 480) and speculating on the line Soviet policy might now take (would Litvinov's view prevail?)

Significantly enough quite a different atmosphere pervades the economic talks which form the bulk of this chapter. The persistent German quest for Russian raw materials found the Russians not uncooperative and the great interest of all German economic authorities in an extension of trade with the Soviet Union already foreshadows the subsequent agreements.

By contrast chapter VII records the steady deterioration of relations with the United States, particularly after the pogroms of November 1938 when Ambassador Dieckhoff stated that "at the moment a hurricane is raging here which renders steady work impossible" (Document 501).

Thereafter formal relations—conducted without ambassadors—were limited to an exchange of stiff notes; and on January 4, 1939, Ribbentrop actually forbade his staff any social intercourse with members of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin (Document 520). In the absence of any clear-cut policy the German diplomats busied themselves with a variety of vexing problems: now blaming "radical and Jewish circles" for Roosevelt's policy (Document 512), now contemplating the economic results of a complete rupture of diplomatic relations (Docu-

ments 504, 505), or anxiously investigating the activities of the *Bund*.

The final chapter—on the Far East—deals largely with the withdrawal of German military advisers and arms aid from China (Document 540), and with German attempts to expand the anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance (Documents 543, 547, 549, 550). In spite of Japanese hesitation the Germans realized that the Chinese war was progressively estranging Japan from Britain and America and "had automatically brought Japanese policy closer to the Axis Powers" (Document 549).

The publication of these volumes, illustrative of German foreign policy before and during World War II, is being undertaken jointly by the British, French, and U.S. Governments. The American editor-in-chief is Dr. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, formerly professor of modern history at the University of Chicago and winner of the Pulitzer Prize in history in 1931 for his book *The Coming of the War 1914*.

Copies of these volumes may be purchased at the Office of the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. at \$3.25 each.

#### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Sept. 17-23, 1951

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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775	9/8	German Doc. Vol. 4 Released
834	9/17	Financial Aid Agreement With Norway
835*	9/17	Exchange of Persons
836*	9/17	Exchange of Persons
837*	9/17	Anniversary of Costa Rica
838*	9/17	Anniversary of Mexico
839	9/17	Information Committee Appointments
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841	9/17	Western Pacific Region (WHO)
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843	9/17	U.N. Information Committee
844	9/17	Pan American Organizations
845	9/17	Congress on Allergy
846	9/17	Bulgarian Imports Suspended
847†	9/17	Turkey Signs Torquay Protocol
848	9/18	Lacy to Overseas Library (rewrite)
849*	9/18	Point 4 Technicians Assigned
850	9/18	Cale: Dir. American Affairs (rewrite)
851*	9/18	Anniversary of Chile
852	9/18	Harriman-Mosadeq Communications
853†	9/18	Malaya Invites U.S. to Study Tin
854†	9/19	Austria Signs Torquay Protocol
855*	9/20	Foreign Service Changes
856*	9/21	Visitors to U.S.
857	9/21	NAC Communiqué and Statement
858	9/21	Acheson: NAC Press Conference
859†	9/21	Film Advisory Committee

(\*) Not printed in the BULLETIN; (†) Will appear in a future issue.

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